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A "defense industry" had not existed in the United States prior to
World War II. The military hardware required to support the modest armed
forces maintained by the United States after World War I had been provided
mainly by government owned and operated arsenals, shipyards and plants.
Aircraft were an exception to this general rule. Most of the non-durable
goods, such as textiles, foods, paints and explosives, were purchased
from firms which produced chiefly for the civilian market. Even in this
area the government was not entirely dependent on private industry. The
Navy, for example, made much of its own paint and rope, and roasted its
own coffee beans.
The Merchants of Death investgation by the Nye Committee in the
Senate, concerning the role of munitions makers in World War I, and
other similar publicity, had set the public climate against private
munitions producers. During the 1930' s, military (national defense)
expenditures of less than one billion dollars a year, of which about one
third was for hardware, had done little toward encouraging the birth of
a munitions industry.
The advent of World War II created requirements for military hard-
ware that initially staggered the imaginations of men in industry and
government alike. The expenditures for national defense rose from
$1.2 billion in fiscal year 1939 to $87.4 billion in 1944. The Gross

National Product (GNP) rose from $90.5 billion to $210.1 billion in the
same period. Not only had the United States industry met the challenge
of war production, but the entire economy had expanded at an unprecedented
rate. Although military expenditures decreased from the all time high
of $87.4 billion in 1944 to $73.5 billion in 1945, the GNP continued
upward to $212.0 billion. (Figure 1) It would seem that rather than
being strained by the demand of war, the United States economy had
thrived on it.
As the war drew to a close, four immediate problems had to be dealt
with by governmental leaders of the United States:
1. demobilization and conversion of the economy to
peacetime production;
2. resumption of New Deal/Fair Deal Programs;
3. reconstruction of the devastated economies of the
European allies and former enemies of Europe and
Asia; and
4. establishment and nurturing of international
machinery for peace-keeping and for world economic,
social, and political development.
The latter two of these problems necessarily conflicted with the first
two. The people of the United States had delayed consumption during the
war and had amassed tremendous savings. They were eager to "return to
normal" so as to avail themselves of the fruits of a productive peace-
time economy. President Truman was anxious to continue many of the
programs of the Roosevelt "New Deal" and add new "Fair Deal" innovations
of his own. (20:295)* However, resources were limited. Thus, trade-off
points had to be considered; i.e., economizing was necessary to achieve
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SOURCE! ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1966(22)

a balanced allocation of resources for consumption, investment, housing,
etc., at home, and the international programs for reconstruction and
economic assistance.
The latter two problem areas centered around the United States'
newly assumed role in world leadership. It soon became evident that
many of the programs undertaken toward solving these problems would
conflict with the long range goals of the Soviet Union. This conflict
emphasized still another United States' postwar problem—limiting the
influence of Communism in the emerging new world.
There was a great deal of uncertainty concerning how to deal with
the Soviet Union as the fountainhead of Communism. During the course of
the war the Soviet Union's military accomplishments had received favor-
able coverage by the news media of the United States. This served to
dim vivid memories of the brutal implementation of Stalin's farm
collectivization program, which cost the lives of millions of kulaks,
and the ruthless purges of the remaining Russian intelligentsia during
1936 and 1937. The invasion of tiny Finland in 1939 and 1940, which led
to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, was not
mentioned, nor was the partnership with Germany in destroying Poland and
the Baltic States in 1939. As a result of the acceptance of Russia as a
worthy war ally, much of the public, and some government officials, felt
that cooperation in the postwar era would present little or no problem.
There were others not so optimistic, but who still considered a long
term rapproachement as an attainable goal.

Despite a continuing facade of friendly cooperation, both Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman were made aware that Stalin was more interested in
promoting the interests of the USSR than world peace. President
Roosevelt had always considered his personal and direct appraoch to
Stalin during their wartime conferences as being successful. However,
a harbinger of the postwar relations with Russia was cast when the
President found Stalin was not sending Molotov as head of the Soviet
Union's delegation to the San Francisco Conference (United Nations) as
he had promised at Yalta. He protested this decision in a letter of
March 24, 1945, to Stalin. Edgar Robinson, in his book The Roosevelt
Leadership, 1933-1945
,
commented on this event as follows: "Roosevelt
clearly was puzzled by what was happening. He was not ready to believe
that Stalin had practiced pure deceit at Yalta. . .the gradual breaking
down of the close cooperation that had developed at Yalta had a depress-
ing effect on the President. I am sure it hastened his death." (58:348)
There were reports that American prisoners liberated in the war by the
advancing Russian Armies were being treated badly. Jonathan Daniels
stated that: "Stalin denied it but turned down a request that, in deal-
ing with the situation, American relief planes be allowed to operate in
Poland. This was in the face of the Yalta promise of the joint action
by the Allies in liberated areas." After receiving a letter from Molotov
concerning the surrender of German forces in Italy, Ambassador Averell
Harriman cabled Roosevelt from Moscow: "The arrogant language of
Molotov 's letter, I believe, brings out in the open the domineering

attitude toward the United States which we have before only suspected.
It has been my feeling that sooner or later this attitude would create a
situation which would be intolerable to us." Roosevelt protested
directly to Stalin concerning "vile misrepresentations of my actions or
those of my trusted subordinates." Stalin issued a disclaimer. Daniels
reported that: "The day he died Roosevelt sent a message to Churchill,
who had long held dark thoughts on the motives of Stalin concerning
policy: We must be firm." (20:268,269)
President Truman, upon taking office, was not privy to much of what
had occurred at Tehran and Yalta. He entered into his first meeting
with Stalin at Potsdam in July of 1948 with an open mind. His initial
evaluation was that "Stalin is as near like Tom Pendergast as any man I
know." I got the impression that Stalin would stand by his agreements
..." By the sixth day of the conference he had heard Stalin ask "how
many divisions does the Pope have" when the subject of the rights of
Catholics in Poland was under discussion. This discussion had broadened
to include Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, whose independence was con-
sidered guaranteed by the Yalta agreements as far as the United States
was concerned Stalin's remarks seemed to indicate that only military
power would cause the Russians to relinquish their control over their
occupied European neighbors. According to Daniels "Truman told Stalin
directly across the table that the United States had no intention of
recognizing Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary until each should have a "free
government established by themselves without pressure from beyond their

borders." That was a position which applied in Truman's thinking not
merely to the specific satellites but to "all the people of the world."
(20:283) Perhaps without fully realizing it, President Truman had
declared "cold war" on the Soviet Union. There can be little doubt that
the experience with Stalin was a sobering one for the new President.
There were many people in the government who felt that the Russians
only behaved as we caused them to behave. Probably the best known and
most influential of the group was Secretary of Commerce and former
Vice President Henry Wallace. It is ironic that Mr. Truman, as Vice
President, had personally managed the Senate approval of Mr. Wallace's
appointment. He had refused to recognize Republicans and twice had
cast the deciding vote. Later, as President, he demanded his resigna-
tion. Mr. Wallace had become a political liability because of his public
attacks on the United States' "hardline policies" toward Russia which
emerged in the year after the cessation of hostilities in Europe.
There were others, both civilian and military, who favored a tough
policy toward Russia. The reasoning was that with the political power
and industries of Germany and Japan both destroyed by the war, the
political and economic vacuum thereby created would afford easy expansion
both eastward and westward to the Soviet Union. The events of the
closing months of the war and of the early postwar period seemed to sub-
stantiate this concern.
In considering how this line of reasoning evolved in the United States
it will be useful to consider the activities of the Soviet Union prior
to and in the early years of World War II. The Soviet Union's leaders

were very mindful of the anticommunist actions of the United States and
Great Britain in Russia during the revolution which had preceeded the
Communist rise to power in 1918. They were equally as distrustful of
Nazi Germany. Their foreign policy centered around two basic concepts:
1. surrounding the Soviet Union with a buffer area of
territory under Communist control; and secondly,
2. promoting and supporting the cause of Communism
throughout the world.
To the Soviet Union's rulers both of these concepts were rational and
essential from military, political, and ideological viewpoints.
It should be appreciated while considering the material below that
aviation is one of the most expensive forms of military assistance in
terms of national resources. The committing of military aviation units
during the 1930' s severely reduced the resources which were available
for expanding the Soviet Union's industrial base. This is some indica-
tion of how important the Soviet Union's leaders considered these
various military efforts to be.
In 1936 and 1937 the Soviet Union actively participated in the
Spanish Civil War by supporting the Loyalists. Germany and Italy
supported Franco.
The Soviet leaders concentrated mainly on strength-
ening Communism and obtaining combat experience, testing
military equipment and techniques, and gaining time to
make additional military and political preparations at
home and abroad. .. .Soviet assistance in aviation to the
Loyalist cause was secretive, consisting primarily of over
1,000 combat aircraft, spare parts ... .anti-aircraft guns,
and searchlights. Pilots, technicians and political
advisors were also sent to Spain. Units of the Red Air
Force actually fought in Spain quite independently of

Spanish control. .. .additional aircraft arrived from
U.S.S.R. late that year or in early 1938 in violation
of international agreements restricting such aid...."
(38:143,144)
The Russians were also active in China. Between 1937 and 1940 they
provided over 450 aircraft and the necessary support activities. Robert
Kilmarx reported in his book A History of Soviet Airpower that "by 1938,
the Russians were conducting a great part of the air operations against
the Japanese. . . .The Soviet air units kept to themselves and, as in
Spain, normally carried out combat missions according to their own
tactical plans and political interests." (38:148) This aid to China
gradually became support of the Chinese Communists as border tension
between Russia and Japan eased following the consummation of the
Russian/German non-aggression pact.
The magnitude of the border incidents between Russia and Japan prior
to this can be appreciated by considering the report that over 600
Japanese and 143 Soviet aircraft were lost in the Battle of Nomonhan
during the period of May 11 to September 15, 1939. One report states
that over 204 Japanese aircraft were lost in the last ten days of August
1939 alone. (38:151)
In August of 1939 Russia had entered a treaty of non-aggression with
Nazi Germany. On September 17, 1939, some two weeks after Germany struck
from the west, Russian troops invaded Poland from the east and within
days advanced to the Nareu-Vistula-San line as agreed to by the secret
protocol which accompanied the treaty. On November 30, 1939, Russia
invaded Finland. The performance of her Army and Air Force was not

impressive and the Finnish war was ended by peace terms agreed to in
Moscow on March 12, 1940. In August 1940 Russia completed the take over
of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, which she had begun in September 1939.
The final move under the pact with the Germans was the occupation of
Bessarabia and other smaller sectors of Rumania in August of 1940.
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Former Ambassador George Kennan remarked that Stalin's demands on
the other Allies at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam were almost identical to
those for which he had bargained with Hitler prior to the signing of the
non-aggression pact. (37:329)
The demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to use military
power to accomplish her goals and the consistency of these goals indicated
to some that she would probably continue to use military power to further
10

her goals after World War II. It was for this reason that most of the
military leaders did not want to de-mobilize too completely or too
rapidly after the surrender of Japan. If the United States was to assume
a position of world leadership, substantial military power as well as
economic power would be necessary.
The United States' plans for demobilization had been predicated on
termination of hostilities in October 1946. The surrender of Japan in
August 1945 all but vitiated these plans for controlled demobilization.
The public demanded an immediate return of armed forces personnel from
overseas. There were demonstrations by troops overseas demanding they
be returned to the United States. Congress responded by directing pressure
on the Executive Branch and even more effectively, by cutting appropria-
tions.
In response to these pressures the military forces were sharply
reduced. Between August 1945 and July 1946 the army was reduced from a
strength of eight millions to two millions. The Air Force was reduced
from 218 combat air groups to what amounted to two effective groups by
early 1947. Although the Navy was committed both to the movement of
troops homeward and supporting occupation forces overseas, it was reduced
from 1,200 to 300 combatant ships. Its aircraft were decreased from
37,000 to 8,000. "In short, United States policy makers and responsible
administrative officials were confronted by a dilemma: the American
people wished their government to act affirmatively as a leading power
and a major force in the world, but they would not recognize the
11

responsibilities and accept the sacrifices that this choice implied inso-
far as these had to be spelled out in terms of military establishment."
(57:49)
During this period of uncertainty the armed forces were burdened
with a superabundance of military hardware. Huge stockpiles of all kinds
of weapons, aircraft and ships far exceeded the requirements of the
greatly reduced Army and Navy. Some of this material was "mothballed"
for possible future use. Much was sold at a fraction of its original
cost. Some in the overseas areas was destroyed in place because trans-
portation back to the United States would cost more than the materials
would bring in the salvage market.
The rush to become re-established in the production of civilian
goods, in conjunction with meager requirements for new military hardware,
caused the huge defense industry of World War II to atrophy with unbeliev-
able rapidity. The national defense budget dropped from $73.5 billion
in 1945 to $14.7 in 1946 and to $9.1 billion in 1947. The GNP faltered
slightly and dropped from $212.0 billion in 1945 to $208.5 billion in
1946. In 1947 it soared to $231.3 billion. Industry was booming but
military hardware had become an insignificant factor. Demobilization had
not harmed the economy but it left the United States' role in the world
affairs somewhat uncertain.
Winston Churchill had proposed an "alliance of English-speaking
peoples" against Communism in a speech at Westminster College at Fulton,
Missouri on March 15, 1946. He coined therein the term "Iron Curtain."
12

Some consider that this speech was the beginning of the Cold War.
(20:279) Senator Claude Pepper, Democrate of Florida responded to
Churchill's speech in the United States Senate. According to Arnold
Rogow, "He was opposed to any gang-up directed at the Soviet Union and
demanded that the United States avoid becoming the foremost supporter
of British imperialism." (59:137) Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace
delivered a speech in Madison Square Garden on September 12, 1946, which
was the extreme opposite of Churchill's. American foreign policy was
anything but clearly defined at that juncture. However, President
Truman elected to pursue a middle course between the two extremes.
The Soviet Union applied considerable political and military
pressure on Turkey after the end of the war. Greece was torn by a
Communist supported insurrection during the same period. Early in 1947
the British Government gave the United States notice that it could no
longer support Greece and Turkey. Rather than give the Soviet Union a
free hand in the Levant with its tremendous oil resources and its two
critical water passages— the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits—the
United States elected to try to "contain" Communism. The President asked
Congress for $400 million for direct aid to Greece and Turkey. The
proposal was justified in terms of national security and supported on
the grounds that "it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures." (20:111) President Truman further stated:
We have considered how the United Nations might
assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent
one requiring immediate action and the United Nations
13

and its related organizations are not in a position to
extend help of the kind that is required.
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free
from coercion, the United States has taken a leading
part in establishing the United Nations. The United
Nations is designed to make possible freedom and inde-
pendence for all its members. We shall not realize our
objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free
peoples to maintain their free institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive movements that
seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. (57:112)
Thus, the Truman Doctrine was announced and the overt confrontation
with the Soviet Union was joined. This policy has been pursued by the
United States in varying degrees since that time and appears to have lead
directly to the United States' present involvement in Vietnam and the
Dominican Republic.
Much of the aid to Greece and Turkey was in the form of economic
assistance. Military assistance was provided also, but it was mainly in
the form of advisors and military hardware from World War II stockpiles.
The National Defense budget did not increase markedly as a result of the
new doctrine. It rose by $1.6 billion to $10.7 billion in fiscal year
1948 and to $13.3 billion in 1949.
Russia detonated her first nuclear bomb in 1949 and a new dimension
was added to the Cold War. The containment policy had not lessened
noticeably the Communist activities in any except the Levantine area.
The Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, and the interference of
local communists in the recovery programs of France and Italy were
dramatic and successful. The defeat of Nationalist China was a bitter
blow for the United States. Both France and Britain were heavily engaged
14

in southeastern Asia in trying to save their empires from the combined
pressures of Communism and Nationalism. With the United States monopoly
on nuclear weapons broken, the Communists were in the position to probe
more aggressively the containment policy.
During the period from the surrender of Japan until 1949, the
United States had placed great reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense
of all other forms of military power. The United States Congress had in
July 1946 specified the size of the army as 1,550,000. This number was
reduced progressively to 1,070,000 by July 1947. The position of the
United States was that it was limited to the use of nuclear weapons or
economic aid as a basis for its foreign policy. General George Marshall,
who was Secretary of State from January 1947 through January 1949,
related: "I was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow,
by radio message after radio message to give the Russians hell. . .at
the time, the facilities for giving them hell was one and one-third
divisions over the entire United States. This is quite a proposition
when you deal with somebody with over 260 divisions and you have only
one and one-third." (57:92)
The continuing struggle with Communism was being felt at all levels
in the United States and new solutions were sought. The armed forces had
been placed under a central agency in September 1947 through a law
initiated by President Truman. President Truman had particular require-
ments for the first Secretary of Defense: "I wanted the meanest so-and-so
I could get as Secretary of Defense." (20:305) The man he selected was
15

his Secretary of Navy, James Forrestal. Forrestal was an advocate of
the "hard line" foreign policy. There were many who felt both the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State would have to be replaced
before a new approach toward a detente' with the Soviet Union would be
possible. George Marshall was replaced by Dean Acheson in January 1949,
and Forrestal by Louis Johnson in March 1949.
Mr. Acheson was an advocate of firmness in dealing with the Soviet
Union. However, President Truman was responsive to the demands for new
attempts for a more flexible foreign policy. He also wanted to minimize
National Defense spending, so as to afford more funds for domestic pro-
grams. James E. Webb, the new Under Secretary of State, had been
Director of the Bureau of the Budget previously and he also favored less
military spending. Thus, the year 1949 was the beginning of an economy
in defense spending.
Nuclear weapons had proved to be extremely expensive and the aircraft
selected by the Air Force as the primary delivery vehicle, the B-36, and
its successor, the B-47, far exceeded the cost of any previous aircraft.
If the United States was to follow the approach of having nuclear weapons
as its primary source of military power and reducing military budgets
concurrently, then both Army and Navy spending had to be sharply reduced
to allow adequate funds for the Air Force.
Secretary Johnson attempted to proceed in this direction. Many
fiscal year 1949 programs were too far along to be greatly reduced. How-
ever, one much publicized blow for economy in the 1949 budget was the
16

cancelling of the Navy's first postwar aircraft carrier— the USS United
States. Scot McDonald recounts that "The House of Representatives had
approved funds of the new carrier April 13, 1949. The keel was laid on
April 18, and Secretary Johnson stopped construction on April 23. The
Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan resigned April 24." (43:70)
Secretary Johnson initiated a severe austerity program in fiscal
year 1950 for all areas of defense except those directly related to the
delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. The cost of the nuclear weapon
program can be appreciated when considering National Defense spending
increased from $13.3 billion in 1949 to $14.1 billion in 1950 despite
the economy effort. (Table 1)
The Soviet Union and Communist China apparently misunderstood the
announced economy moves in defense spending as a retreat from her
earlier firm policies. The United States began to reduce her overseas
forces, including those in Korea in early 1950. In June 1950 Communist
forces invaded South Korea.
The challenge was met and during the Korean War the United States
essentially developed a dual economy. The GNP leaped from $284.8 billion
in 1950 to $328.4 billion in 1951. It reached $345.2 billion in 1952 and
$364.6 billion in the last year of the war, 1953. Defense spending
climbed from $14.1 billion in 1950 to $33.6 billion in 1951, $45.9 billion
in 1952, and $48.7 billion in 1953. The GNP rose to $364.8 billion in
1954, an increase of only $.4 billion, but defense spending fell sharply
to $41.2 billion. There had been little restriction on private
17

consumption during the conflict and the required production had been
met. The economy had acquired a new, and what now appears permanent,
sector—defense industry.
Defense spending was held to about $40 billion a year until 1957.
When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, the United
States suddenly realized several important things:
1. the Russians were far ahead in production of large
rocket engines;
2. Russian scientists and engineers were not second
rate and could produce well under the Communist
system; and,
3. the industrialization of the Soviet Union under
Communism was proceeding at an alarming rate.
The realization that possession of the huge rocket engines required
for launching large satellites had allowed the Russians to leap-frog the
manned bomber as the primary means of delivering nuclear weapons on
targets in the United States was cause for concern both from a military
and political standpoint. The term "missile-gap" came into the vernacular,
The Defense budget increased to $45.9 billion in 1958. Pressure by
President Eisenhower for a balanced budget assisted in holding defense
spending to $46.0 billion in 1959 and reducing it to $44.9 billion in
1960.
With greatly increased strategic nuclear capability in the offing,
or in being, the new administration of President Kennedy which took
office in January 1961 emphasized conventional weapons and land and sea
forces. The defense spending for 1961 was $47.8 billion and for 1962,
18

$51.6 billion. President Johnson's similar policies in 1964 resulted
in defense expenditures of $49.9 billion and in 1965, some $52 billion.
Regardless of which party has been in power and who the President
has been, defense spending has averaged almost $50 billion a year since
fiscal year 1959. There has been a reasonable consistancy in the
foreign policy of the United States and therefore the same general
consistency in defense spending. Although only about one-half of the
defense budget was used to procure military hardware, this $25 billion
a year has fostered a full-fledged defense industry.
The preceding discussion indicates that the defense industry
developed as a necessary adjunct of the United States' foreign policy.
Inasmuch as the keystone of foreign policy was containment of Communism,
it is of interest to view briefly the military spending of the Soviet
Union during the same period.
It is very difficult to compare spending of the Soviet Union with
that of the United States. Their published budget is but a pamphlet as
opposed to the formidable tome of the United States. While Congressional
hearings bare almost every military program of the United States to
world scrutiny, very little public mention is made of the Soviet Union's
military spending except when a decrease is announced. Statistical data
released in the Soviet Union are not consistent from year to year.
Several studies by the Rand Corporation in recent years have done much
to indicate the true amount of military spending. But even then there
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The military expenditures of the Soviet Union probably averaged
between six and ten percent of GNP during the mid and late 1930' s. By
1944 military expenditures comprised about forty percent of the Soviet
Union's GNP. The United States was allocating essentially the same
percentage of its GNP. Bergson observes, however, that as the United
States demobilized rapidly after World War II, the Soviet Union slowed
its military spending at a much lesser rate. Military expenditures by
the United States, not including economic assistance, were about one-
third that of the Soviet Union in 1948. (9:103) It is of particular
interest to note on Figure 2 the sharp rise of Soviet Union expenditures
in 1948. This was the beginning of new programs by the Communists which
included the coup-d' etat in Czechoslovakia in February, the Berlin block-
ade later that year, and the invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
Becker suggests that the apparent decrease of military spending by
the Soviet Union during the past ten years is probably due to improved
"masking," "distorted screening," and "secreting" of such spending,
rather than a real change. (7) His estimate of true spending is shown
on Figure 3. Whether or not this is accurate, it seems apparent that
the Soviet Union will continue to allocate sufficient resources to her
military sector to pursue both domestic and international goals. If she
can accomplish those goals and reduce military expenditures she will do
so, but there is no indication that the pressure of this spending has
lessened her willingness to sacrifice both investment and consumer
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The case presented thus far shows the United States allocating
resources to military power in response to some overt action on the part
of Communism. The Truman Doctrine was in response to probes in Greece
and Turkey. The Berlin Air-Lift was in response to a blockade of that
city. The North Atlantic Treaty organization was in response to Russia's
maintenance of land forces capable of overrunning an unorganized Europe.
The Korean War was in response to an invasion. However, not all Americans
see things in this context. Perhaps the best presented case of a dif-
ferent view is that of C. Wright Mills. In his books The Power Elite (49)
and The Causes of World War III (50) , he states a thesis that the
"corporate rich," the "military warlords," and the "political directorate"
form a power elite which directs both the economy and the foreign policy
of the United States. This small minority of white, Anglo-Saxon, protes-
tants, who tend to move freely between sectors, require a state of
continuing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union as a
means of insuring a profitable defense industry and continuing status quo.
He disclaims that there is an overt and reasoned conspiracy among these
leaders of industry, the military, and the politicians, but rather there
is a circumstantial coincidence of interests and long range goals. A
foreign policy which requires military power to be efficacious creates
the need for a large military organization. This means promotion, power,
and status for the military. It also continues the requirement for a
defense industry to support the military organization. This means profit,
power, and status for the industrialist. Defense industry and the military
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both depend on the Congress for continued appropriations. Senators,
Congressmen, and other politicians who mold foreign policy need financial
and political support from industry and the military—hence, a mutually
dependent and supporting triumvirate. Despite his disclaimer, one cannot
escape the feeling that he is picturing a well calculated plot rather than
a "coincidence of interests."
It is of interest to note that some of the ominous foreboding of one
facet of his writings has been dispelled by recent events. Election of
Catholic President Kennedy, the appointment of Jewish and pro-labor
Arthur Goldberg as Ambassador to the United Nations, and the appointment
of Negro Thurgood Marshall as Solicitor General of the United States are
illustrative. Also the existing programs of the Great Society were not
possible in the grim vista he presented.
However pessimistic of the present state of affairs, Mr. Wright was
rather mild when compared to Fred J. Cook's vitupartative book The War-
fare State . (16) Mr. Cook does not exhibit a compulsion for accuracy
in details and presents a distressing picture of policy-making in the
United States, indeed. He considers that Admiral Leahy's "thorough
indoctrination [of President Truman] was to lead with dramatic swiftness
to an about-face in attitude—a change of direction that, though it has
gone virtually unrecognized marked the virtual birth of the cold war only
eleven days after Roosevelt's death." The indicent he spoke of was
President Truman's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Molotov on
April 23, 1945. The subject under discussion was whether the United
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States should support the seating of the Communist backed Lublin Polish
government in the United Nations. Mr. Truman was apparently suffering
under the illusion that Russia would adhere to the Yalta and Tehran
agreements, and said so in "blunt language unadorned by the polite
verbage of diplomacy." (16:83)
Mr. Cook considers that the power elite has gained control of the
government. "The Pied Pipers of Military and Big Business, who have
been drumming into our ears the siren song of 'peace through strength'
can no longer conceal the brink toward which they lead us." (16:340)
Though he overstates his case, there is some gnawing truth in what he
cites concerning our contemporary world. However, he fails to pose any
explicit alternatives for the United States. Inasmuch as Bertrand
Russell wrote the forward to the book, perhaps the alternative is to be
assumed. Mr. Russell states that Mr. Cook's "thesis is that the 'military
industrial complex' has become so powerful in the United States that it
dominates the Government and is at the same time so insane that it is
quite ready to advocate what is called pre-emptive war against the
Soviet State. The evidence which he adduces is massive and unanswerable
except by plain abuse." (16:vii)
President Eisenhower, in his farewell address of January 17, 1961,
took recognition of the defense industry and the military-industrial
complex by issuing a caveat:
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United
States had no armaments industry. American makers of




But we can no longer risk emergency improvision
of national defense. We have been compelled to create
a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.
Added to this, three and a half million men and women
are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We
annually spend on military security alone more than the
net income of all United States Corporations .
Now this conjunction of an immense military establish-
ment and a large arms industry is new in the American
experience. The total influence—economic, political,
even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house,
every office of the Federal Government. We recognize
the need for this development. Yet we must not fail to
comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources,
and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure
of our society.
In the councils of Government we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought
or unsought by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist . (Underlining provided) (23)
Thus, it can be seen that at least part of the thesis addressed by
authors Mills and Cook warranted the attention of the President.
Regardless of whether the foreign policy followed by the United
States since World War II has been best, or whether the amount and kinds
of military power created in support of it has been optimal, a defense
industry was created and exists at the pleasure of the Federal Govern-
ment. But what is the present structure of this industry? Is it weak
and well diffused through the general structure of United States
industry? Or is it tightly knit and centered around a few large firms
as is the automotive industry? What are its formal and informal rela-
tions with its major customer—the Department of Defense?
This research effort is addressed to these and other pertinent





1. there is a discernible trend toward concentration
in the Defense Industry; i.e., fewer and larger
firms;
2. the decision-making and other management techniques
presently used in the Department of Defense are
contributing to, and accelerating, this trend; and
3. there are countervailing forces in the Congress,
and the remainder of the Federal Government which




THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
The United States' experience during World War II in integrating
the economy and the military effort, and in integrating the activities
of air, surface, and naval forces dictated a thorough re-orientation of
structures and command relationships in the Executive Branch. The onset
of the Cold War gave immediate impetus to these needs and emphasized
another— the need for machinery to continuously evaluate the overall
national strategy.
Toward these ends, President Truman sent a message to the Congress
on December 19, 1945, proposing, among other things, a single Department
of National Defense. It was to be headed by a Secretary of Cabinet rank
and supported by an Under Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries.
Three coordinate combatant branches and a common service organization
were the major components. Each of the three combatant branches—air,
land and sea forces—was to be under an Assistant Secretary. A unified
and centralized service organization was to be under either military or
civilian leadership.
Mr. Charles Hitch, in discussing President Truman's plan, stated:
The central purpose of President Truman's
proposal was to provide for "unified direction of the
land, sea, and air forces at home as well as in all
other parts of the world where our armed forces are
serving." In order to achieve this purpose, he felt
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that "we should have integrated strategic plans and
a unified military program and budget." In this
connection he stressed a principle which I believe
is only now (1965) being generally accepted in the
Defense Department, namely, and I use his words,
that "strategy, program, and budget, are in all
respects of the same basic decisions." His plan
also stressed the economics that could be achieved
through the unification of supply and service functions,
the need for strong civilian control, and the requirement
for unity of command in outlying bases." (31:15)
However, the real beginning of the unification legislation was
not President Truman's message. There had been hearings before a
House Select Committee in the spring of 1944 on this subject. There,
the Navy took a strong stand against the creation of a single department
of military services and a separate air service. The person who was most
prominent in this stand was Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.
There were others in the Navy who felt unification was not only
desirable but necessary. Admiral H. E. Yarnell had published an
article in the Naval Institute Proceedings in August of 1943 favoring a
single Department of War with a civilian head. He also testified to
this effect before the Select Committee.
There were certain elements within the Army who did not favor
unification or the creation of a separate Air Force. The Marines, too,
were concerned about their role under unification. With all these
diverse forces in operation it is small wonder that by 1945 four
separate unification plans had been proposed. One of these, the
"Eberstadt Plan," had been introduced by Forrestal. This plan emphasized
coordination rather than unification. When the strongly centralized
unification plan endorsed by President Truman was sent to the Congress,
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James Forrestal, now the Secretary of the Navy, continued his opposition.
President Truman leveled strong criticism at the Navy and Secretary
Forrestal in November of 1946. Secretary Forrestal then took his case
directly to the President on November 17, 1946. Concerning that meeting
he stated:
The President is not taking sides either for
or against the Army or Navy. He simply wishes to get
the best organization possible for the national
security. I share this wish as, I am sure, do all
thinking citizens.
Speaking personally, I am for unification. The
form it takes is for the President and Congress to
decide, and the Navy is not foreclosed from presenting
its views. (48:151)
"Well aware of the personal risks involved, Forrestal on several
occasions in 1945-1946 expected an imminent White House request for his
resignation as Secretary of the Navy. Nevertheless, he continued to
insist that coordination rather than unification should be the objective
of a major reorganization of the Military Establishment." (59:223)
The law which eventually evolved, the National Security Act of 1947,
was far different from that proposed by the Administration. It created
a National Military Establishment under a Secretary of Defense. It
comprised three co-equal, separately organized and administered
executive departments— the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The act also
provided for a military Joint Staff. Two other agencies were created to
assist the President in the broad area of national security— the National
Security Council, and the National Security Resources Board.
The strong influence of Navy Secretary Forrestal, as a proponent of
"coordination," can be seen in the duties of the Secretary of Defense as
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delineated under the 1947 act:
(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National
Military Establishment and for all of the Departments
and agencies therein;
(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over
such departments and agencies;
(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary
duplications or overlapping in the fields of procurement,
supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;
(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget
estimates of the departments and agencies comprising
the National Military Establishment; formulate and
determine the budget estimates for submittal to the
Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs
of such departments and agencies under the applicable
appropriations Act.
Inasmuch as the law provided that "all powers and duties relating to
such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary by this
act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries" the
Secretary of Defense was in essence directing a holding corporation.
Hanson Baldwin commented in the New York Times that the role of Secretary
of Defense was fashioned in [Forrestal ' s ] own image. (3)
President Truman, in recalling his thinking of February 1946, stated
"I wanted the hardest, meanest so-and-so I could get as Secretary of
Defense." (20:305) Whether Mr. Forrestal's qualifications were apparent
before his running battle with the Administration over the shape of the
National Security Act is not known. But his choice as the first Secretary
of Defense is ironical, indeed.
In his first year of office the Secretary of Defense became acutely
aware that the loose confederation of the three military departments
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which he had championed was not going to accomplish the level of
integration required. In his first annual report to the Congress he
recommended that "the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense
should be materially strengthened... by making it clear that the Secretary
of Defense has the responsibility for exercising direction, authority,
and control over the departments and agencies of the National Military
Establishment. (27)
Secretary Forrestal, tired and in poor health, resigned March 2, 1949.
He died by his own hand May 22, 1949, less than two months after his
resignation. This may well be testimony of the demands of what is
probably the second most powerful job in the United States.
The recommendations of Secretary Forrestal, the Hoover Commission,
and others provided the basis for amendments to the National Security Act
in 1949. These amendments broadened the powers of the Secretary of
Defense and provided him greater flexibility. He was designated as
"the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department of Defense. 1 ' The Department of Defense (DoD) succeeded the
National Military establishment and it became an executive department.
This latter step was done at the expense of the Army's, Navy's, and Air
Force's status as executive departments. The service secretaries lost
their right of direct appeal to the President and the other privileges
and powers which devolve to secretaries of executive departments. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff was provided with a chairman and the Joint Staff
increased from 100 to 200 officers.
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Mr. Hitch specifies one most important change which is often
overlooked. 'Title IV was added to the Act creating the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and providing for uniform budget and
fiscal procedures throughout the Department.'' (31:16)
The experiences of the Korean War indicated the full magnitude of
the planning, control, and coordination required within the government
in integrating economic and military matters under conditions of limited
hot war in the general Cold War environment. A committee headed by Nelson
Rockefeller studied the matter at the request of the President. Its
report of April 1953 was the basis for a new reorganizational plan. (70)
This plan established a clear single line of authority from the President
to the Secretary of Defense and downward. The Secretary was provided a
better staff and still greater management flexibility. The Secretaries
of the Army, Navy and Air Force were described as heads of their depart-
ments as well as "operating managers" for the Secretary of Defense. The
independent Munitions Board and Research and Development Board were
abolished. Their functions were transferred to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. (OSD) The number of Assistant Secretaries was
increased from three to nine and the position of General Counsel was
established.
The next Defense Reorganization Act in 1958 was the result of
pressures created by the Russians' launching of Sputnik I in October
1957. It provided for the elimination of the requirement that the three
services be administered separately, although they would remain separately
organized. The secretaries of the three departments were removed from
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the operational military chain of command and the role of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff was strengthened. The Joint Chiefs of Staff committee system was
replaced with a unified staff. The staff was increased to 400 officers.
The increasing need for centralized control of research was recognized
in the creation of a new post of Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering.
The areas of resource allocation planning and defense mobilization
had been the province of the National Security Resources Board under the
provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. It, and its immediate
successor, the Office of Defense Mobilization, were directly responsible
to the President. The President had also established in 1950, by Execu-
tive order, the Federal Civil Defense Administration. There was much
overlap in these organizations and in the summer of 1958 they were merged
to form the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. This agency was
assigned to the Executive Office of the President. In 1961, President
Kennedy, recognizing Civil Defense as but a part of the overall defense
effort, placed that part of the agency's responsibilities under "the top
civilian authority already responsible for continental defense— the
Secretary of Defense." The remainder of the Office of Civilian and
Defense Mobilization responsibilities were reassigned to other agencies
or incorporated into a new agency in the Executive Office—the Office of
Emergency Planning. (32:38)
President Kennedy considered in 1961 that additional changes in the
Defense Department would be required to insure responsiveness to national
objectives and technological change. His Committee on the Defense
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Establishment chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, in fact, did recommend
even greater Secretary of Defense authority. However, the strong role of
the new Secretary, Robert McNamara, in managing the Department of Defense,
forestalled statutory change.
Thus, it can be seen that all present statutory authority was avail-
able to the Secretary as early as 1958. Unification, as envisioned by
President Truman, was possible from that year on, but it remained for
Secretary McNamara to wield the available authority in such a fashion as
to cause de facto unification.
The foreign policy which created the defense industry, together
with a burgeoning technology which continued to shrink the world and
speed the clock, had also served to create the second most centralized
locus of power in the United States Government—the Secretary of Defense.
Only his boss— the President—has access to greater economic and military
power.
In considering the relationship of the defense industry to the
government, the role of the Secretary of Defense, with his now well
defined and established monolithic organization, becomes crucial. His
policies can cause great pressure for economy and efficiency in the
Defense Department and the defense industry. By the same token, if he
were to become a "captive" of the defense industry, the caveats of





CERTAIN MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The statutory provisions for centralizing authority in the Defense
Department as cited in the preceding chapter were not immediately ac-
companied by the improved management techniques necessary to effect
strongly centralized control. The main concern voiced by Mr. Forrestal
prior to becoming Secretary of Defense had been that one man would have
great difficulty managing an organization the size and complexity of the
Defense Department. Mr. Robert McNamara, the incumbent Secretary of
Defense, entertained the same reservations. Recalling his thoughts when
asked by President-elect Kennedy to serve in that capacity he had wondered
"whether I, or any other person, could truly manage the Department of
Defense." (45)
Yet most observers would agree that Secretary McNamara now has
adequate decision-making rules and other management tools necessary to
exercise the full statutory authority at the disposal of the Secretary of
Defense. This would tend to leave the impression that Mr. McNamara
brought to office not only his substantial personal qualifications, but
also an assortment of new management techniques. It can be demonstrated
that this was not necessarily the case. Following is a brief examination




The single factor that was most disturbing to organizational
relationships and tactical and strategic concepts during World War II was
technological advance and innovation. One interesting point of view
concerning that war pictures the scientists of both sides busily devising
new measures and counter-measures while the military eagerly tried to
exploit the products of their genius. (5) When one considers the
importance of radar, proximity fuses, electronic communications, snorkel
submarines, nuclear bombs and other radically new devices in the prosecu-
tion of that war, the view has considerable merit.
Technological growth has always been of exponential order. The
implications of this have become more obvious in the past twenty years.
One new invention can trigger a whole new family of developments. On
occasion a new development is sufficiently radical to provide a "quantum
jump" effect. Gunpowder provided such an increase over muscle-powered
weapons. Nuclear energy provided such a gain over conventional explo-
sives.
As an example of how rapid recent technological growth has been, let
us consider the thinking and words of Dr. Vannevar Bush, a leading
scientist who has been active at highest governmental levels since
before World War II.
"Under the guidance of Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, it was decided in December, 1941,
that the possibility of obtaining atomic bombs for use in the war was
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great enough to justify an 'all out' effort for their development." (36:35)
The estimate for time required to produce the first bombs was three to
four years. It was a full year—December, 1942—before Enrico Fermi
demonstrated a self-sustaining nuclear reaction in his laboratory under
the stands of the stadium at the University of Chicago. Yet less than
four years after the decision was made to proceed, two bombs had been
used against Japan. Dr. Bush's vision was of the highest order— 20/20
so to speak.
However, in December, 1945, Dr. Bush made the following statement
while testifying before a Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy:
Let me say this; there has been a great deal said
about 3,000 mile high angle rocket. In my opinion
such a thing is impossible and will be impossible
for many years. The people who have been writing
these things that annoy me have been talking about a
3,000 mile high angle rocket shot from one continent
to another carrying an atomic bomb, and so directed
as to be a precise weapon which would land on a
certain target such as this city. I say technically
I don't think anybody in the world knows how to do
such a thing and I feel confident it will not be done
for a very long period of time to come. I think that
we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the
American public would leave that out of their thinking.
(11:434)
One cannot say that Dr. Bush was not well versed on the state of
technology and spoke from culpable ignorance. Rather he underestimated
the rate of technological growth that was to be fostered by the tremen-
dous allocations of resources to defense problems in the ensuing years.
At the close of World War II the implications of the role technology
would play in future wars was all too apparent. Two nuclear bombs had
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been used against Japan. Although the yield of those weapons was
trivial by modern day standards— the equivalent of twenty- thousand tons
of TNT—it was clearly an order-of-magnitude jump in destructive power.
Some 2,000 V-2 rockets had been rained on England by the Germans in the
closing days of the war in Europe. Traveling supersonically these
weapons were seldom seen or heard, let alone intercepted, prior to
impact. The jet engine which was just coming of age offered a commen-
surate quantum jump in aircraft speeds and altitudes.
All of these new innovations served to support the concept of
"total war." No longer would a country be able to depend on the oceans
or waste lands of the world as insulation from military attack. Nor
would there be any assurance that future combat would be restricted to
small areas of oceans, land, and air when military forces stood in
opposition. The entire surface of the globe had become a potential
battle field and every inhabitant a potential participant, willingly or
otherwise.
All of the weapons for waging warfare on this scale had several
common features
:
(1) they were extremely expensive to develop and maintain;
(2) the lead times for such complex systems were quite long;
(3) the advancing technology would ever shorten their useful life;
i.e., the period from inception to obsolescence would decrease
approximately as the inverse of the rate of technological
expansion;
(4) there would be more feasible types and variations of weapons
available than any single country could afford to develop; and
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(5) once the public realized, or perhaps was led to believe, that
a potential enemy possessed weapons of total war, there would
be demand for effective countermeasures. These countermeasures
naturally fall heir to features 1 through 4.
The management decision-making rules to encompass the scope of
considerations set forth above did not exist at the Defense Department in
its beginning years; yet as is true with most of history, there was no
sharp break with the past. Rather there was an accelerated evolution of
management techniques capable of maintaining some semblance of order in
a new environment where chaos seemed inevitable.
Weapons Systems
One of the first broad changes in thinking concerning defense
management was that of how to consider a weapon. A nuclear explosive
device is a weapon. For it to be a threat to an enemy it must be
deliverable to a target which the enemy does not want destroyed. The
device could be delivered, conceivably, by aircraft, missile, torpedo,
gun, or even shipped to them in a crate. The aircraft could be trans-
oceanic multi-jet bomber or a single engine propeller driven attack
bomber launched from an aircraft carrier. The missile could be one
launched from land, the surface of the sea, under the sea, air, or a
satellite in space. Although the method of destruction has been
specified, there is almost an infinite combination of men and machines
which could be used in the delivery of the device. To think of the
explosive device in isolation from all components necessary to accom-
plish its mission as a weapon is really meaningless. The entire process
must be considered as a whole, and then the term "weapon system" obtains.
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There is no single and absolute definition of what is meant by
weapon system. It is a concept—a way of thinking—rather than a
narrowly construed and unchanging combination of word symbols. The
Department of Defense has defined a weapon system as follows:
The term "weapon system" comprises facilities and
equipment, in combination or otherwise, which form an
instrument of combat to be used by one or more of the
military departments.
The proposed definition is necessarily broad, as
are all aspects of the weapon system concept, because
the outstanding feature of the concept is flexibility.
To fall within the weapon system concept, an instrument
of combat [or support] is designated as a weapon system
at high levels of the military departments. (75:546)
Messrs o Peck and Scherer who have performed the most intensive and
extensive study to date of the weapons systems acquisition process of
the United States define a weapon system as:
. . .Any composite of equipment (e.g., a manned air-
craft, an early warning radar unit, or a reconnaissance
satellite with supporting gear) employed as an entity
to accomplish a military mission such as destroying
enemy installations, identifying or intercepting
hostile bombers or shipping, covering the advance of
infantry, surveilling the earth's surface to detect
unauthorized tests, etc. Thus a weapon system is a
set of potential military capabilities. (54:251)
Messrs-, Kast and Rosenzweig approach the weapon system concept as a
major factor which has served to shape modern management techniques.
They state:
A weapon system—as contrasted to the weapon itself
—
is a total entity consisting of an instrument of combat
such as a bomber or intercontinental ballistic missile,
together with all related equipment, supporting facil-
ities, services, and trained personnel, required to
bring the instrument upon its target or to the place




The three definitions, while cast from different viewpoints, are
all consistent in that they are flexible, they express a comprehensive
view of the total system and they all depend on a sense of a system
mission. The full importance of this type of thinking can best be
appreciated when one starts trying to isolate the costs associated with
providing a system for the accomplishment of a specific mission.
Weapon Systems Management
The full range of management responsibilities in connection with a
weapon system would include the determination of a mission (requirement)
,
the design of a system to perform the mission, the production or procure-
ment of that system, and the introduction of that system into operational
use and then support of the system through its useful life. In past
years simpler weapons systems such as the Springfield rifle underwent
this full cycle under the purview of governmental managers. More
sophisticated weapon systems such as ships and airplanes also have been
handled in this way. However, even before World War II aircraft had
exceeded the governmental agencies' abilities to keep the full cycle
"in-house." By 1965 only certain ships and submarines built in Navy
shipyards could possibly qualify as completely "in-house" major system
procurements. Even this last bulwark appears to be crumbling before the
advance of progress. (21)
There are at least two overriding reasons why the government does
not attempt to maintain a capability to perform the full weapons system
cycle internally. The first is the sheer size of the organization
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required. The additions of millions of engineers, scientists, and blue
collar workers to the Department of Defense payroll would please almost
no one. Industry would certainly not be in favor of it. People who
favor disarmament would have mixed emotions over this at best. It is
relatively easy to terminate a government contract with private industry.
But when one considers the political maneuvering necessary to close or
drastically reduce a government agency, disarmament could well be
hampered.
The other factor is the concept of "free enterprise" as opposed to
government-operated industrial concerns. Besides being the traditional
"American way," the main arguments are that "free enterprise" is both
more efficient and more flexible. Why this should necessarily be so in
the production of weapons systems has never been convincinly demonstrated.
Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzwieg define the weapons system management
concept as: "a philosophy of management which emphasised the importance
of timely integration of all aspects of a weapon or support system from
the establishment of operational requirements through design, develop-
ment, production, personnel training, operation and logistic support."
(34:117)
They summarize the weapon system management phases as:







In general the military services have retained full responsibility
for perceiving needs, although there is explicit machinery to allow
industry and inventors to submit unsolicited proposals for concepts,
systems, and components. However, the great majority of design, produc-
tion, and delivery of weapons systems is now in the hands of private
industry. To date, private industry has shown little interest in becoming
greatly involved in the utilization phase, although there is some
participation in the more sophisticated systems.
The Air Force has led both the Army and the Navy in the trend
toward contracting more of the weapon system procurement cycle to
private industry. There were two main reasons for this. When the Air
Force came into being in 1947 it had little "in-house" capability for
developing its own weapon systems. There were no government owned and
operated missile or aircraft plants to match the Navy's shipyards or the
Army's arsenals. Nor did they have a civilian "in-house" scientific and
engineering organization to match that of the Army or Navy.
The Air Force also was interested primarily in advanced systems
which were at the limits of existing technology. The combination of
limited "in-house" capability and the requirement for extremely advanced
systems caused the Air Force to recognize new management concepts much
more quickly than the better established and more conservative Army and
Navy. The Air Force created "think shops" and management firms such as
Aerospace Corporation, The Rand Corporation, and Space Technology




The Air Force was formally reorganized to facilitate the "systems
approach to management" in 1961. The Navy, the last to so organize, did
not accomplish this until 1966.
Many different management structures for a particular weapon system
can result when one, or more, of the management phases is performed by
private industry. In as much as the hallmark of the weapon system
management concept is flexibility this is to be expected. In some cases
industry produces and delivers a system, which was perceived and designed
by the military, to the military for operation solely by the military.
In other instances a civilian concern may be called upon to manage design,
production, delivery phases and assist in the operations phase. More
recently some of the larger defense concerns have established study
groups whose mission is to improve the company's competitive position by
assisting or anticipating the military services in the perception phase.
Regardless of who has direct management responsibility for which
phases, the overall weapon system is budgeted and supervised by the
sponsoring military department. That particular department's budget is
but part of the total Defense Department budget. It is through overall
departmental wide budget control that the weapon system activities of






When Mr. McNamara became Secretary all of the military services had
already established management procedures which accommodated the "weapon
system management" concept. However, the overall coordination and
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integration of the services did not prevent development of overlapping
or duplicating systems. The roles of each service had been spelled out
under the National Security Act of 1947, and had been clarified by
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
occasion since then. However, problems such as who was to be responsible
for intermediate range ballistic missiles and tactical missiles still
arose. The Air Force naturally considered such missiles as aircraft,
although without wings, and therefore clearly in their province. The
Army, with equal clarity, saw such missiles as improved range artillery
which did not require a gun barrel, and hence part of their domain. The
simultaneous development of the Air Force's Bomarc and the Army's Nike
anti-aircraft missiles was another example of system duplication.
Mr. McNamara had stated on several occasions his management philos-
ophy at the departmental level.
The creation of the Department of Defense resulted
from the clear recognition that separate land, sea
and air warfare is gone forever . The National
Security Act of 1947 and its various amendments down
through the Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1958 established the Department and the basis for
its operation .
. . . .Two broad philosophies could be followed by a
Secretary of Defense. He could play an essentially
passive role—a judicial role. In this role the
Secretary would make the decisions required of him
by the law by approving recommendations made to him.
On the other hand the Secretary of Defense could play
an active role providing aggressive leadership—
questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing
objectives, and stimulating progress. This active




The first thing he required to implement his management philosophy
was some means of getting an overview of the whole defense posture.
What was the "master plan" and which service contributed what to it? How
well did this plan relate to current national security objectives as
determined by the President and the National Security Council?
Budget control had been exercised by the Secretary of Defense for
years, but there was no clear relationship between the budgets of the
services and their contributions to the total defense posture. In 1955
the Joint Chiefs had caused a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan to come
into being. It was updated yearly and projected the major force require-
ments for the next four to five years for each of the services. It was
but a mosaic of the unilaterally developed plans of the individual
services. The Air Force emphasized strategic bombers, the Navy, aircraft
carriers, and the Army, land forces. Little indication was evident that
any great effort had been exerted toward making it a well integrated,
mutually supporting, national defense program.
The thing that controlled the size of the military services and the
weapon systems they could possess was the amount of national resources
which Congress allocated to them. The common denominator for resources
in a price free -market economy, such as the United States, is legal
monetary tender— in this case dollars. The vehicle by which dollars are
requested and tentatively allocated is the President's budget. Therefore,
what could have been more natural for a man whose forte in the world of
private industry has been comptrollership, than to consider the budget
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as his most reliable source of information and his primary means of
management control?
It will be necessary to introduce at this juncture the man considered
by the writer as having had the second greatest impact on management in
the Defense Department—Mr. Charles Hitch. He is hailed by President
Johnson as "a principal architect of America's defense establishment—
.
It is largely as a result of his efforts that this country now possesses
the most balanced, flexible, combat-ready defense force in history, and
a management system to maintain our superior military posture and use it
with precision." (31:cover)
Mr. Hitch had served as Head of the Economic Division, and Chairman
of the Research Council at the Rand Corporation during the years 1948
through 1960. During that time he personally had undertaken studies and
written reports concerning program budgeting and systems analysis. He
and Roland McKean authored a book in 1960, that literally became the
"bible" of the Pentagon
—
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age .
(32) The two major tools associated with Mr. McNamara's regimen,
program budgeting and systems analysis, were actually expressed in Rand
reports during the mid 1950 's and were in the process of implementation
in the Air Force by 1960.
Mr. McNamara recognized the soundness of the Rand approach to many
of the defense problems and drew heavily on that source for personnel.
Mr. Hitch became the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in
January, 1961. He remained in that job until September 1, 1965, when he
resigned to become the Vice President, Comptroller, of the University of
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California. In 1965 he wrote another excellent book
—
Decision-Making
for Defense—which provides much of the basis for the following discus-
sion of planning, programming, budgeting and systems analysis. (31)
Defense Secretaries prior to Mr. McNamara had operated under a
"budget ceiling" approach. The President, with the assistance of economic
and other policy advisors, would determine a general level considered
appropriate for defense spending. The Secretary of Defense then would
allocate these funds among the three services according to his own
evaluation of their contribution to the defense posture. This approach
caused each service to derive its own set of priorities for its proposed
projects whose total cost always exceeded the funds the service would
receive. Although each of the services probably made near optimal
allocation of their funds from their viewpoint, there was absolutely no
assurance that efforts of the three services were mutually supporting and
non-overlapping.
Another shortcoming of the traditional system was that, although
weapon system planning might be projected over four or five years into
the future, budgeting was done on a annual basis. This meant that
programs were approved on the basis of their first year's cost, and it
would be years before the full cost of the system would become apparent
to the Secretary or Congress. Mr. Julian Dell, a veteran of the War
Production Board, and over twenty years of experience in defense procure-
ment, referred to this as "floating an iceberg to Congress." This




The essence of these difficulties was that there was no meaningful
link between planning and budgeting. Budget control was exercised by
the Secretary but planning was done at the service level. The planners
worked in terms of mission performance, weapon systems, or forces.
Budgeting was done in terms of personnel, operations and maintenance,
construction, etc. The former were the "outputs" of the Defense Depart-
ment, the latter the "inputs." When a weapon system was adopted by the
planners, there was no assurance that the Secretary and his staff would
understand fully the budgeting implications.
These problems had been recognized in the Congress and the Chairman
of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative George Mahon, had
sent two letters on this topic to the Secretary of Defense in 1959. In
the first he stressed the importance of looking at the defense program
and budget in terms of major military missions, by grouping programs and
their cost by mission. In the second he asked "for more useful informa-
tion and a practical means of relating costs to missions." (31:26)
Messrs. McNamara and Hitch were in general agreement on a financial
management philosophy. It would have to result in a budget acceptable
to Congress, account for funds in the same manner in which they were
appropriated, yet provide managers at all levels in the defense establish-
ment the information they needed to do their particular job in an
effective and economical manner. It would also have to provide financial
information required by other agencies of government.
Recognizing that the financial management system which had evolved
over the years could not produce the desired data, the concept of
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"programming" was incorporated. Mr. Hitch had proposed these new
procedures to the Secretary in the spring of 1961 and recommended
eighteen months be the target time for developing and installing it.
Mr. McNamara approved the concept but shortened the time table to six
months
.
The military planning function and the budget function were both well
established. Rather than disturb the whole system by implementing
completely new program budgeting concepts as set forth in Mr. Hitch's
earlier book (32:56), the "programming function" would establish a
bridge between existing procedures. This resulted in a financial manage-
ment operation of three phases
—
planning-programming-budgeting.
The basis for the planning phase is a modified version of the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan(JSOP) . This is reviewed annually by the Joint
Staff. Through this vehicle the Joint Chiefs recommend, to the Secretary,
the forces and programs they considered to be required over the next five
to eight years. The Secretary reviews these recommendations, directs any
further studies he feels are necessary, and then provides "tentative force
guidance" which serves as a basis for preparing formal change proposals
to the official five-year program.
The second phase
—
programming—requires the sorting of forces and
activities into "program elements." Elements are:
Integrated combinations of men, equipment and installa-
tion whose effectiveness can be directly related to
national security objectives, i.e., the B-52 bomber
force including all supplies, weapons, and manpower to
make it militarily effective, attack aircraft carriers,
F-4 Fighter Wings, etc. Whenever possible program
elements are described in physical terms such as numbers,
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as well as financial cost, i.e., outputs and in-puts
—
benefits and cost. Costs are measured in terms of
"total obligation authority"—the amount required to
finance the program element in a given year, regardless
of when funds are appropriated by the Congress, obligated,
placed on contract or spent. (31:32)
Program elements are then assembled in groups which relate to the major
missions of the Defense Department. This is necessary for decision
purposes so that mutual support or substitution possibilities are readily
discernible. The major mission grouping by programs are:
1. Strategic Retaliatory Forces
2. Continental Defense Forces
3. General Purpose Forces
4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Reserve and National Guard




All of the program data including the description of forces, missions
,
procurement lists, facilities list, etc., are collectively described as
"The Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program." The data are
machine processed and are summarized in many different ways. Special
summaries which show forces, financial, manpower, and procurement programs
are updated regularly and provided to the top management of the Defense
Department. Once "The Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program"
is approved by the Secretary it is binding for programming purposes on
all components of the Department.
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The third phase of the planning-programming-budgeting cycle is the
annual budget review. The program review serves as a basis for the
budget review but not a substitute. In the budget review there is more
attention to the details of the annual procurement lists, production
schedules, lead time, prices, funds status, etc. Funds are still managed
in terms of appropriation accounts as well as in terms of the program
structure. "The annual budget essentially represents a detailed analysis
of the first annual increment of the approved Five-Year Plan." (31:39)
The planning-programming-budgeting process not only provided the
Secretary with the management overview and means of control necessary for
positive leadership, but it also accomplished what many observers felt was
impossible—de facto integration of the armed services.
Systems Analysis
At this juncture we have seen how the weapons systems management
concept came into being, and how a weapon system is planned, programmed,
and budgeted into the overall defense program. The one crucial area
that has not been discussed is how to select from the myriad of possible
weapon systems, those best suited to the requirements of national security
and which are economically feasible.
Systems analysis, or cost effectiveness studies, was the second
major management tool implemented in the Defense Department under the
aegis of Secretary McNamara. Yet once again Mr. Hitch and others of the
Rand Corporation had been interested in this technique since the early
1950' s. Mr. Hitch authored a Rand Report in 1955 titled "An Appreciation




Another person instrumental in introducing this concept into the
Department of Defense, and who preceded Mr. McNamara, is Dr. Alain
Enthoven. He served with Rand from 1956 through May 1960. He preceded
Mr. Hitch in the Department of Defense by some eight months, having served
in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering from
May 1960 until May 1961. He then was appointed by Secretary McNamara
first to be Deputy Comptroller for Systems Analysis, and later to be
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. He became Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Systems Analysis) on July 7, 1965.
Systems Analysis, as used in the Defense Department, is a rather
new term and did not become common until the early 1960's. However
Mr. Hitch considers this term to be synonymous with cost effectiveness
study. (31:43) This latter term is linked through cost benefit analysis
directly to "engineering economics," a field which has its roots in
Wellington's classic work The Economic Theory of Railway Location which
was published in 1877. Professors Eugene Grant and W. Grant Ireson of
Stanford University, in their modern day classic The Principles of
Engineering Economy , establish the following rules for economic studies
of governmental activities:
1. Define alternatives clearly and try to determine
the differences in consequences of various
alternatives
.
2. In so far as practicable, make these differences
commensurable by expressing them in terms of money.
3. Apply some criterion to the monetary figures to
provide a basis for judgment whether proposed
investments are justified. The time value of




4. Choose among alternatives applying the foregoing
criterion but also giving consideration to the
differences among alternatives that were not
reduced to money terms. (29:436)
A recent Rand Report on Military Analysis, edited by E. S. Quade, lists






"The Criteria Rule is described as a rule or standard by which to rank
the alternatives in order of desirability and to choose the more promis-
ing. It provides a means for weighing costs against effectiveness."
(56:8) It can be seen that except for explicit mention of "objectives"
there is no basic difference between the Quade rules and those provided
by Grant and Ireson some years ago.
Mr. Hitch describes this type of analysis or study at the Defense
Department level as: "studies which compare alternative ways of
accomplishing national security objectives and which try to determine
the way that contributes the most for a given cost or achieves a given
objective for the least cost." (31:43) Dr. Enthoven in a more formal-
istic approach stated:
Military choice can be a very subtle and complex
matter. At its heart one generally finds crucial
issues of criterion selection, values and intangibles,
and of risk and uncertainty about nature, technology
and enemy reactions. No simple formal model of
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choice is likely to be sufficient for a satisfactory
analysis of most real military problems. But it is
often enlightening to formulate parts of the problems
of choice in economic terms, that is, in terms of
discovering the most effective uses of limited
resources. (32:361)
Most recently, and after some five years of experience with systems
analysis in the Defense Department, Dr. Enthoven stated:
What is systems analysis? I have not been able to
produce a good brief definition. I would describe
the art, as it has evolved in the Department of
Defense, as a reasoned approach to problems of
decision . Some have defined it as "quantitative
common sense." Alternatively, it is the applica-
tion of methods of quantitative economics analysis
and scientific method, in the broadest sense, to
the problems of choice of weapon systems and
strategy . It is a systematic attempt to provide
decision makers with a full, accurate, and meaning-
ful summary of the information relevant to clearly
defined issues and alternatives. (Underlining
provided) (24:99)
Mr. Enthoven, in an effort to dispel possible confusion, makes a
clear distinction between systems analysis and operations research.
Although the two are part of the same continuum, he considers the latter
as applicable to problems of specific dimension. "Operations research
accepts specific objectives and given assumptions about the circumstances,
the hardware, and the like, and then attempts to compute an optimum
decision, usually maximizing or minimizing some objective, given the
available resources." He considers that systems analysis has a much
broader orientation. It is focused more on exploring the implications
of alternative assumptions than extensive analysis of a single set of
assumptions. It is not usually concerned with optimization but if it is,
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it is in a broad rather than a specific sense. It is designed to avoid
gross errors and to give the decision-maker a solution of alternative
mixes of costs and effectivenesses. It is part of systems analysis to
question the objectives." (24:115)
Although there was an adjustment period during which the various
military departments had to learn to function under the systems analysis
approach to weapon system selection, it appears to be working well.
There was concern at first that experience and judgment would not play
a sufficient role in the analysis. Now that the departments have learned
how to inject the intangible considerations into the studies which they
present to the Secretary's office this concern has lessened. Mr. Hitch
casts the proper perspective for the rule of systems analysis in Defense
Department decision-making in his statement that:
Systems Analysis should be looked upon not as the
antithesis of judgment, but as a framework which
permits the judgment of experts in many sub-fields
to be combined— to yield results which transcend
any individual judgment. This is its aim and
opportunity.
[Compared to narrow, well defined problems]
we tend to be worse in an absolute sense in applying
analysis or scientific method to broad context
problems; but unaided intuition in such problems
is also much worse in an absolute sense. Let's
not deprive ourselves of any useful tools however
short of perfection they may fall. (30:25)
The real impact of systems analysis, along with the planning-program-
ming-budgeting method of financial and overall management, is that in
reality, major weapon systems selection is done at the Secretary of




CONTRACTING POLICIES IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The process of selecting weapon systems for inclusion in the United
States 1 national security machinery is not accomplished in a governmental
vacuum. There is continuous liaison at all levels between the Defense
Department and the Defense Industry. Yet the ultimate decisions as to
which weapon systems to investigate, which ones to procure, and what
research to sponsor are all made within the Defense Department. Thus far
the emphasis has been on intragovernmental decision-making and procedures
The next area for consideration is how these decisions are converted
into end products— the procedures wherein the government engages the
Defense Industry to produce the desired materials and services.
Traditional economic theory concerning buyer/seller relations,
pricing, and economic efficiency in a competitive price, free-market
economy is based on the assumption that there are a large number of
sellers and buyers who meet in an open market. Competitive prices are
free to adjust to the pressure of supply and demand. The seller who
offers a better product at the market price, in theory, will capture
more of the market and exert pressure on his competitors to meet his
quality standard or lose sales. If there is great demand for a product
then prices will adjust upward and more sellers will be attracted into
the market. During the initial phase, profits will be high--actually
in excess of what it takes to get sellers to provide that product in
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the long run. As more sellers enter the competition for sales of that
particular product prices will drop. Inefficient firms which could
survive when prices were high and profits "excessive" can no longer re-
main in the market.
If established sellers attempt to overprice their wares, buyers will
not buy at that price and the market becomes glutted. As prices drop to
a level that will attract buyers, the inefficient producers again will
be forced out of the market. Thus, if sellers try to maximize their pro-
fits, and buyers try to maximize the amount of satisfaction they gain
from spending their limited resources in the market, a general condition
of dynamic equilibrium is created. The prices and quantities of goods
act as signaling devices to both buyer and seller, and the market per-
forms the tricky task of optimizing profits, buyer satisfaction, and the
allocations of all resources within the market structure.
This simplistic model is fraught with shortcomings in the real
world. These shortcomings, as well as more sophisticated models, are
presented in any basic text on macro and welfare economics. Baumol does
an excellent job putting basic economic theory into the context of pre-
sent day quantitative techniques. His Economic Theory and Operations
Analysis is commended to the non-expert reader who is interested in the
special applications of economic theory to some of the real problems in
resources allocation. (k) For the purposes at hand, it is necessary
only to establish the type of market situation which governs the Defense
Department in buying major weapon systems.
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There is only one buyer of major weapon systems in the United States--
the Defense Department. The condition of "monopsony" is said to exist.
With many sellers and only one buyer it would seem at first blush that the
buyer would be able to rule the market with an absolute iron hand. With
a fair and impartial single buyer it would seem that the market could
be immediately adjusted so that he could optimize on his limited resources
by dealing with only the most efficient firms. The buyer's judgment
would adequately supplant the function of the market. Although an
arbitrary decision has been made to allocate a substantial portion of the
total economy's available resources through a single buyer, the total
economy is protected by the buyer's careful and judicious allocation of
these resources.
But there are not large numbers of firms which can produce sophisti-
cated weapons systems. In the case of 'one of the kind' systems which
have never been built before, how is the Defense Department to know
which will be the most efficient firm? The obvious answer is to let all
potential producers compete for the job. But what if the weapon system
is considered critical to the defense posture and the low bidder is not
a proven producer of anything which has a close relationship to the sys-
tem under consideration? Or what if all bids are far above what the De-
fense Department considers a reasonable price? The number of complica-
tions that can be adduced are infinite. Therefore, quite a number of
contractual schemes have evolved which are attempts to solve the diffi-
culties of a monopsonistic buyer dealing with a near oligopolistic group
of major weapon system producers.
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The rules which govern the Defense Department's formal intercourse
with the Defense Industry are set forth under the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations (ASPR). These guidelines are based mainly on a body of
statute law which comprises the Armed Services Procurement Act of 19^7
and other related legislation. Both the Act and the Regulations have
been updated periodically. (^0)
The number of changes has increased considerably in recent time
as the McNamara regimen has attempted to exact in its dealings with the
Defense Industry the same order of flexibility and efficiency it has pro-
moted within the Defense Department. The latest changes are the ones
which are related to the hypotheses under investigation. However, it will
be necessary to discuss briefly a number of the types of contracts and
their use in the past to appreciate the implications of the changes.
For the interested reader several extensive and intensive analyses
of defense contracting have been published by Moore, and by Peck and
Scherer. (51. 5^> 62) A very complete history and commentary on the
laws and regulations concerning defense procurement is found in Laurent's
Legal Aspects of Defense Procurement . (^0) All of these offer a sub-
stantial and valuable background to the problems under consideration.
The various types of contracts which the Defense Department may use
in procuring goods and services are delineated under Part k, Section III,
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations. There is some flexibility
and, in theory at least, many permutations of the various contract types
are possible. There is a specific prohibition against the type of
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contract which would allow the contractor to be paid a fee based on a
percentage of the costs incurred in the executions of the contract.
Two broad categories of contracts are easily distinguished— the
fixed price and the "cost reimbursement." Under each of these categories
there are several types and sub-types. Only those that are currently
used by the Defense Department in reporting statistics will be described
below:









d. Time and Materials
la. Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
This is the type of contract that is commonly used in private busi-
ness. The contractor must satisfy the terms of the contract at the
specified price.
lb. Fixed Price with Redetermination (FPR)
This contract has a fixed price, but the price is subject to re-
negotiation at intervals during the term of the contract. There are
several different forms of this type contract. Form A is essentially
a series of firm fixed price sub-contracts for future work which are ne-
gotiated as the basic contract progresses. The price is set for the
upcoming period. Form E is just the opposite and the redetermination is
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on the price to be paid for work already accomplished. This form resembles
a cost type contract and is seldom used. Forms B, C, and D are between
these extremes and the total package of contract possibilities offers a
great deal of flexibility.
lc. Fixed Price Incentive (FPl)
The purpose of this contract is to provide incentive to contractors
to reduce costs and share these savings with the government. A target
cost and a target profit are negotiated. The total of this cost and pro-
fit is the target price. A price ceiling and a formula for adjusting
final price and profit are also negotiated. The formula establishes the
rates at which the government and the contractor share cost savings or
overages. If the actual costs are less than the target cost, the savings
are shared in accordance with the agreed formula. In a 75/25 formula
the government would receive 75% of the savings and the contractor the
remaining 25%. Moore points out that, in fact, the firm fixed price
contract is the limiting case of the fixed price incentive contract: the
sharing formula is O/lOO. (51:6) If the costs are below estimated cost
the contractor receives 100% of the saving. By the same token if his costs
are over the estimates he pays 100% of the overage.
Id. Fixed Price Escalation (FPE)
This contract is quite similar to the firm fixed price contract,
except the final price may be adjusted to reflect increases in price of
certain specified resources the contractor must use; i.e., labor, concrete,
steel, etc. This contract has particular attractiveness in construction
and shipbuilding for obvious reasons.
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2a. Cost With No Fee (CPNF)
This contract is used only in cases where the contractor is willing
to be reimbursed only his cost. It has constituted 3$ or less of the dollar
value of all contracts consummated in any year since 195^. Its primary
use is for studies performed by non-profit organizations.
2b. Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF)
This contract establishes an estimated cost to be incurred by the
contractor in performing the contract and an additional set fee, which
is computed on the basis of the estimated cost, as payment to the con-
tractor. In theory if the costs vary, the fee remains fixed. The statu-
tory limitation on such fees is 10$ in procurement contracts and 15$ in
research and development contracts. However the Regulations (ASPR) promul-
gated by the Defense Department cut these, in normal circumstances, to
7$ and 10$ respectively. This type contract has particular application
where costs are difficult to predict or the exact scope of the work is
difficult to define. For these reasons there are frequent cost overruns
and other apparent abuses. This type of contract is usually associated
with the "horror cases" which are revealed by the General Accounting Of-
fice and Congressional Committees wherein overruns of hundreds of percent
in cost and years in time are publicized. Peck and Scherer report twelve
major CPFF contracts completed during 1955 _ 196l that had overruns which
averaged 320$ and schedule slippages which averaged 36$. These were all
contracts which involved great uncertainties in scope and technological
requirements and it is doubted the Defense Department could have induced
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the contractors to accept the work under other contractual arrangements.
(5^:22)
2c. Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF)
This contract resembles the Fixed Price Incentive contract in
several respects. It specifies a target cost and a target fee. There
is a formula specified for adjusting the fee contingent on whether actual
cost is more or less than the target cost. The difference between this
and the FPI contract is that there is no total cost ceiling on the CPIF.
As in all cost types of contract there is no guarantee of complete per-
formance of the work specified, or requirement on the contractor to de-
liver a product or service. When the target cost is reached the contrac-
tor is not obligated to do anything further. To be functional, the tar-
get cost must be high enough to provide the contractor real incentive to
incur costs less than the target so as to earn a higher fee. If target
cost is obviously less than, or very close to, minimum probable cost
there is no incentive.
2d. Time and Materials, and Labor-Hour
These are seldom-used contracts and amount to less than one half
percent of the total dollar value of Defense Department contracts in any
year since 195^- They are essentially means of contracting for just
labor, materials, and services in support type contracts.
Performance Incentive Contracts
An innovation of the McNamara managment team, the performance in-
centives provided under a recent change to ASPR, do not constitute a
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separate type of contract. Additional incentives in the form of increased
fees are offered under FPI and CPIF contracts to encourage superior per-
formance, not only for cost reductions, but for "timeliness of delivery,
capability and serviceability of the product, ease and simplicity of
operation, economy of maintenance, etc." (ASPR 3-ko6, 2a) In practice,
these incentive fees can result in greater costs to the government than
if costs were the sole criterion. However, the incentives are so con-
structed that the changes of the delivery timing and/or the increased
performance are considered to provide an increase in value to the govern-
ment which exceeds the increase in cost.
Thus, it can be seen that there is a wide selection of contractual
arrangements available to the Defense Department.
Methods of Awarding Contracts
The fact that there is an adequate battery of contracting instru-
ments has been established. The next step is to consider how the Defense
Department determines who shall receive contracts.
The ASPR sets forth two alternative methods of selecting contractors.
The first is "formal advertising," and the second is "negotiation."
The first is designed to take advantage of market type competitive be-
havior. The second is intended for use when "competition is not feasible
Inasmuch as competition is the preferred method, all of the situations in
which negotiation is permitted are considered to be "exceptional."
The formal advertising method of contracting has been prescribed by
law since 1809- As technological change has become an increasing factor
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there has been an increasing number of exceptions which permit negotia-
tion. It is obvious that procurements best suited to formal advertising
are those whose scope can be readily specified, that require no advance
in the state of technology, and both the government and the contractors
have adequate knowledge and experience on which to base estimates of cost
and time schedules. These attributes are also the ones that would permit
the use of firm fixed-price contracts. The ASPR established the general
rule that "contracts awarded after formal advertising shall be of the
firm fixed-price type, except that fixed price contracts with escalation
may be used where some flexibility is necessary and feasible." (ASPR 2-10M
The ASPR, under Section III, Part h, delineates the procedures for
making contracts by negotiation when formal advertising is not feasible
or practicable. The following are the legal bases for negotiation:
(1) during national emergencies;
(2) in case of public exigency;
(3) for purchases not in excess of $2,500;
(k) for procuring personal or professional services;
(5) for obtaining services of educational institutions;
(6) for making purchases outside of the United States;
(7) for procuring medicine or medical supplies;
(8) for procuring supplies intended for authorized resale;
(9) for procuring perishable or non-perishable subsistance supplies;
(10) in cases where procurement by formal advertising is impractic-
able;
(11) for obtaining experimental developmental or research work;
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(12) for making classified purchases;
(13) for procuring technical equipment requiring standardization;
(14) for procuring technical or special property requiring sub-
stantial initial investment or extended period of preparation
for manufacture;
(15) in cases where the formal advertising method has not produced
satisfactory results;
(16) for industrial mobilization procurement; and
(17) in cases where otherwise authorized by law.
One can but wonder if there is any procurement that could not be
fitted under at least one of these exceptions if the procurement officers
were not bound by stringent policy guidance issued by the Secretaries of
Defense and the several military departments.
Regarding the type of contract which is to be used for negotiated pro
curements, the statutory guidance is: "the head of an agency may, in
negotiating contracts under Section 230^ of this title, make any kind
of contract that he considers will promote the best interests of the
United States." (Section 2306, Title 10, USC)
As shown in the earlier part of this chapter he would have a wide
selection indeed if he was not constrained by policy considerations.
Contracting Policy Guidance Under Secretary McNamara
After a well considered study of the Defense Department procurement
activities the Secretary reported to the President on July 5, 19^2, that
he was implementing a cost saving program. The goal was to reduce logis
tic cost by $3 billion per year within five years. This was to be accom
plished without economizing on the force structure or necessary hardware
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Phase I of this program was "Buying Only What We Need" and included:
a. Refining Requirement Calculation;
b. Increased Use of Excess Inventory;
c. Eleminating "Goldplating in Specification."
Phase II was "Buying at the Lowest Sound Price" and included:
a. Shifting from Non -competitive to Competitive Procurement;
b. Shifting from Cost Plus to Fixed Price and Incentive Type
Contracts
.
Phase III was "Reducing Operating Costs" and included:
a. Terminating Unnecessary Operations;
b. Standardizing and Simplifying Procedures; and
c. Consolidating and Increasing the Efficiency of Major
Operating Services: Supply, Communications, Transpor-
tation and Maintenance.
While all of these endeavors had a direct or indirect effect on
contracting policies, those of Phase II are the ones of immediate con-
cern. In discussing the shift to competitive procurement the memo
stated:
Maximizing competition in Defense Procurement is sound
public policy. It is one of the most effective means
of broadening the industrial base and ensuring that
we obtain the lowest sound price on what we buy. The
purchase of specialized military items, however, involves
unique problems which tend to limit our opportunities
to buy competitively. We are attempting nevertheless
to expand continually the opportunities for competitive
bidding even on those specialized items .... (^6)
On July 12, 1965, the Secretary of Defense reported to the President
that kk.Sfo of all fiscal year I965 contracts were competitive procure-
ments. He estimated that every dollar shifted to competitive contracts
saved the government thirty-six cents. The estimated $2.2 billion so
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that in I965 only 17.6$ of the total contract value, or $4.8 billion of
$28 billion was "formally advertised." This was an increase of 3-2$ from
the previous year when $4.1 billion of $28.8 billion, or 14.4$, was for-
mally advertised. But this is an increase of only $.7 billion and the
Secretary reported $2.2 billion "shifted to competition." This raises
an interesting point.
There are other means of inducing competition besides formal adver-
tising. Sealed bids are also used in the case where the procurement has
been designated as a set-aside' for small business concerns only. Com-
petitive proposals are also required for open market purchases of $2,500
or less, except when the procurement is under $250. Formal advertising
is not used in these small purchases because administrative costs would
usually exceed any possible savings. In large prime contracts every
effort is made to solicit two or more sources for competitive price, de-
sign or technical proposals. The policy is to get comptetition regardless
of which method of procurement is used. This program has been effective
and the results are seen in Figures 4 and 5-
The other program under Phase II, the shifting from cost plus
fixed fee" contracts to "fixed price" and incentive contracts has also
shown results. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate that fixed price contracts
accounted for $17-5 billion or 76.5$ of the total dollar value of con-
tracts let in 1965. This was a gain of over 19$ since i960 when fixed
price contracts reached their lowest point on the chart. Figure 8 shows
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the same period. Although cost plus fixed fee contracts reached their
highest usage in 1959 and i960, and fixed price contracts reached their
lowest point, one must not assume that this was due entirely to the lack
of a proper contracting philosophy. The late 1950 's saw many large con-
tracts let for weapon systems which were "pushing the state of the art."
They required technological break-throughs for completion, and cost plus
fixed fee contracts were the only feasible means of getting contractors
to undertake the work.
The Charles Plan: Total Package Procurement
The evolution of the weapon system concept, the weapon system manage'
ment scheme, and the reasons why more of the weapon system procurement
cycle is being contracted to defense industry were noted earlier. It has
been pointed out that the total cost of a weapon system must include
operational and maintenance costs as well as initial procurement costs.
In this chapter, the efforts to promote efficiency in defense contracting
were cited. It was posited that the 'market place" of defense procure-
ment places the responsibility for creating competition among the firms
of defense industry directly on the Defense Department. It was inevitable
that some perceptive individual would recognize that all of these factors
should be integrated into one set of rules governing the procurement of
major weapon systems. Why not carefully define a weapon system and then
solicit competitive bids for total management of the design, development,
production, and operational support of that system? The bids would have
to be firm and binding on the contractor. With two or more bids in hand
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the Defense Department could subject them to a thorough cost effective-
ness study and then select the best overall bid, Why not indeed?
The gentleman who possessed just such an insight is Assistant Sec-
retary of the Air Force, Robert Charles. He is a relative latecomer to
the McNamara team, having taken an office November 29> 1963- His pre-
vious work with NASA from September I962 until November I963 certainly
acquainted him with the problems he was to encounter in the Pentagon.
Without doubt his seventeen years with McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
prior to that have been equally as beneficial. Both Fortune and Armed
Services Management magazines credit him with the Total Package Procure-
ment Plan. (47,66)
Mr. Charles considers that total package contracting does nothing
but apply the concepts of a free economy operating in a market place
environment to major defense procurements. It allows the government,
just as any other buyer, to choose between products on the basis of firm
bidding commitments, which include performance, support equipment, and
other factors which affect lifetime costs. The winning competitor's
profit is determined under an incentive arrangement wherein opportunity
is related to risks. Profit is targeted initially under competition and
is, in the end, determined by the quality of the product and by the
contractor's efficiency.
The following discussion is based on a most informative and enjoy-
able interview granted the writer by Mr. Charles on March 17, I966.
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To appreciate what this means one must remember that in the past
development was usually undertaken as an isolated phase, and under a
cost plus fixed fee arrangement. If the development phase went well
and the government decided to "follow up" with a production contract,
then the price had to be negotiated. Inasmuch as the contractor who
did the development work usually ended up with most of the jigs, dies,
fixtures, and machinery necessary for production, competition was seldom
feasible for the production phase. No other contractor could afford to
duplicate the development contractor's personnel and facilities. Nor
could the government afford to do it for them. For this reason the com-
pany which won the development contract was practically assured, without
making any commitments on production, of winning the follow-on contract
which represents about 80% of a major weapon system procurement. Without
making any commitments toward performance, production price, and without
real competition the development contractor became the production con-
tractor. The development cost represented little of the eventual cost
of buying and operating the weapon system--hence the use of the term
'iceberg procurement." The part of the system cost that was visible
originally was but a small percentage of the eventual total cost of the
system.
If the performance of a system can be defined with reasonable ac-
curacy and if required technology is already advanced to the point that
the system can be accomplished through straightforward development engi-
neering, then all commitments concerning operational equipment can be
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obtained before development engineering starts. The government can enter
a fixed price contract, with incentives, for the required amount of hard-
ware, including all ancillary equipment, and state specifically the level
of performance that must be afforded by the system over its lifetime.
The Total Package Concept is the logical culmination of the manage-
ment and contracting philosophies which had evolved over the years and
were focused by the McNamara regime of the Defense Department: award a
fixed price contract to a competitive bidder for an entire weapon system,
including operational phase considerations, and let the contractor function
as the weapon system manager. What does this mean in dollars? The
Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missle system has already absorbed 1.5 billion
dollars. The B-70 manned bomber also cost $1.5 billion. The Polaris
system was costed at $2.5 billion, and Minuteman at $2.1 billion. There
are few major weapon systems which do not carry a lifetime price tag on
the order of $1 billion or more. Clearly, the Total Package Concept has




THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
The first hypothesis under investigation, as stated at the close of
Chapter I, is that "there is a discernible trend toward concentration in
the Defense Industry." The second hypothesis is that "the decision
making and other management techniques presently used in the Department
of Defense are contributing to, and accelerating, this trend." The
management techniques which are considered germane have been discussed
in Chapters III and IV. Following is a consideration of the structure
of the Defense Industry and how Defense Department management practices
impinge on it.
Figure 9 demonstrates that over the past seven years major hard
goods comprised about 70% of the value of all the defense prime contracts
of over $10,000 awarded for work in the United States. The remainder of
the awards includes two segments; about 25% for all other goods such as
consumables, petroleum products, and minor hardgoods, and 5% for services
These segments are suitable both for purchase in small quantities and in
diverse locations. It is not surprising, therefore, that as Figure 10
indicates, small business has been awarded about 50% of the first segment
and 25% of the latter. But only some 5% of the major hard goods category
has gone to small business.
"Small business" as used here is considered as one that is inde-
pendently owned and operated, is not dominant in its field of operations,
and with its affiliates does not employ more than a specified number of
employees (usually not more than 500, 750, or 1,000) depending on the
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This category includes aircraft, missile and military space systems,
ships, tank-automotive equipment, weapons, ammunition, and electronics
and communications equipment. Figure 11 shows that the most important
components of this category are aircraft, missile and space systems, ships,
and electronics communications equipment. The small business portion of
all components is minor with the exception or "weapons." Figure 12
reflects this exception as well as the very constant and limited scope of
aircraft and missile prime contracts going to small business.
The aircraft, missiles and space, and ship sectors contain the great
bulk of "weapon systems." Therefore the weapon system management concept
and the total package procurement concept will have their greatest impact
here. It will be useful to review briefly the only "total package pro-
curement" that has been effected to date and then consider its possible
effects on the Defense Industry.
The C5A Procurement
The Air Force let contracts in late 1963, totaling some $1.6 million,
to three airframe and two jet engine manufacturers to study the feasibility
of a giant subsonic transport aircraft and the required engines. By
September of 1964 all studies had been completed and they were in
unanimous agreement that both airframe and engines were feasible. In
December of that year the Air Force formally requested proposals for the
airframe and engines. The first step was a "contract definition phase"
of four months in which the contractors were to solidify detailed pro-
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The three airframe manufacturers were Lockheed, Boeing, and a
combine centered around Douglas which included North American Aviation
and Martin Marietta. The engineering design teams, and the total company
efforts required for such an undertaking, especially in the allowed time
span, were formidable indeed. The Air Force provided each contractor
some $6 million dollars toward this effort. In addition Boeing spent
some $20 million, Douglas $19 million, and Lockheed $16 million of their
own funds in completing their proposals. All completed their proposals
prior to the April deadline.
The Air Force proceeded to evaluate the three proposals using systems
analysis techniques. There was continuous liasion between contractors
and Air Force during this phase as the evaluation group tried to satisfy
the following questions. Who offered the best airframe from a performance
standpoint? Who offered the best engine from the performance standpoint?
Whose product was the least expensive?
The cost effectiveness equation reported to have been used was:
Cost Effectiveness equals (U.E.) x U x Vb x P x Cp
Cost
U.E. = Unit equipage, the number of aircraft for six squadrons.
U = Utilization rate, hours in the air per day
Vb = Block speed factor, based on the time between two given
points at the most efficient cruising speed plus 15 minutes.
P = Payload
Cp = Correction of payload for terminal effectiveness, meaning
minimum landing runway requirements.
Cost = The price of the aircraft, ground handling equipment, etc.,
plus ten years operating expenses. (47)
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The decision between engines was relatively easy because of a major
difference that was easily expressed in quantitative terms. General
Electric 's engine was superior on the basis of fuel consumption.
The airframe was not easy. Boeing used more sophisticated design
concepts but offered better performance if they worked. Lockheed used
more proven techniques but offered somewhat lower performance. Douglas
was between the other two but ended up at odds with Air Force engineers
concerning certain design calculations. Lockheed submitted the lowest
bid and Boeing the highest. There was no way a decision could be reached
based on quantitative considerations alone.
The Air Force "source-selection" board (obviously a misnomer)
decided overall considerations indicated the Boeing design. The decision
was reversed first by a review group and then by the Air Council at the
Department of the Air Force level. They both chose Lockheed. The
Secretary of Defense approved the selection of Lockheed. The President
did not object.
It has been suggested that one of the intangible considerations
that may have entered at Department of the Air Force and higher levels
was that of maintaining a balanced and broad mobilization base in the
airframe-missile industry. The plant which Lockheed will use for the
bulk of its work is leased from the government and is located in Marietta,
Georgia. It was producing the Lockheed C-141 Starlifter which was to be
phased out as the C5A production began. Without the C5A contract this
plant would probably have become idle and Lockheed would have ceased to
be a competitor in subsonic jet transports.
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The plant, which employs some 10,000 people, is located in the home
state of Senator George Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. This has also been considered as a possible factor favoring
selection of Lockheed.
The Defense Department could defend easily its decision on the basis
of greater certainty of getting a suitable aircraft both on time and at
a lesser cost. On the other hand it is obvious that the Defense Department
has a responsibility to consider such factors as the industrial mobili-
zation base, and the overall impact on the nation's economy. It would
also be unusual if political considerations did not warrant some attention.
Regardless of the factors which influenced the decision, it was made and
effected. Lockheed received a fixed-price incentive contract that had
an overrun ceiling of 130%. If maximum overrun occurs the 58 Aircraft
contracted for will cost close to $1.7 billion.
It would seem that the procurement of an aircraft system under
conditions such as this could have a traumatic effect on the aircraft
producers. Yet, the losers, Douglas and Boeing, continue to exist as
profitable firms. They gambled millions on the competition and lost
—
or did they? Mr. John Mecklin, in an excellent article on the C5A which
appeared in Fortune
,
considered that Lockheed might well gain an unbeat-
able edge in the area of very large subsonic transport aircraft. (47)
However, Boeing recently announced that it was going into production on
its transport model 747. This aircraft is a direct result of Boeing's
C5A design effort and will carry nearly 500 passengers in its final
version. Douglas has already produced an interim aircraft of the
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250 passenger category by modifying its DC-8. It also announced that it
will continue to develop its C5A design into a model DC-10. The C5A
competition appears to have been anything but detrimental to the partici-
pants.
Thus it can be seen that the first "total package procurement" had
major implications for the aircraft and defense industries. Had the
awarding of the contract forced either Boeing or Douglas out of the air-
craft manufacturing business, then the structure of the Defense Industry
would have been altered considerably. In this case all three of the
competitors seem to have benefited, and a new level of contracting
efficiency appears to have been reached by the Defense Department.
However, had there not been immediate commercial application for the
system designs, the losers would not have faired so well.
In the long run total package procurement would seem to portend
little change for the structure of the Defense Industry. Figure 11
indicates that aircraft, plus missiles and space, represent an average
of some 45% of the value of all the defense contracts let for work in the
United States. The only firm which can undertake missile and aircraft
systems are the very large ones. As cited earlier small business gets a
very samll part of this market directly—less than 10% of the combined
aircraft and missile-space sectors. Regardless of what method the
Defense Department uses for selecting the prime contractor, under present
management practices one of the large contractors will be the successful
bidder on all large system procurements.
One impact of buying large systems is demonstrated by Figure 13.
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total value of all defense contracts over $10,000, have captured 70 to
75 percent of such contracts. The "top 50" firms' percentage has fluctu-
ated a great deal more. The "top 10" firms have been more stable and the
"top 5" firms' share, while declining slightly, has been very stable.
This does not mean necessarily that the same firms are in the "top 5"
consistently. It does mean that large contracts make up a very substantial
portion of each year's contract value and firms which receive even one
large contract can stand very high in the listing of firms. It will be
seen also, in a later chapter, that there is a considerable degree of
stability in the contractors appearing on the upper end of this list.
It seems very unlikely that total package procurement will diminish the
size of contracts or change the listing of top contractors. If anything
it will tend to solidify present conditions because larger contracts may
result, and even with present size contracts only the very large firms
can afford to spend millions of dollars preparing proposals.
The fact that 100 firms shared $18.5 billion in 1964 and $16.7
billion of defense contracts in 1965 is noteworthy in itself. The
additional fact that this was 73.4% and 68.9% of the total value of all
defense contracts of over $10,000 value for those years is more indicative
of the concentration within the defense industry. Figure 15 is even more
revealing of the degree of concentration. The firms which rank 100 through
51 account for just 10.5% of the "top 100" firms' share of the market. The
firms which rank 100 through 11 account for only 51% of the total. The
ten top firms account for 49% of the top 100 firms' market share and 35%
of the total for all firms. The "top 5" firms account for 32% of the top
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typical for all years since 1958.
The structure of the defense industry may be summarized as follows:
(1) a small number of very large firms of which in any given year
five will get about one quarter of the defense contracts:
(2) about twenty large firms including those very large firms not
in the "top 5" which account for another one quarter of the
total:
(3) another seventy-five large firms which account for another
quarter of the total;
(4) a multitude of small and intermediate size firms which share
about one quarter of the market.
Some indication of the large number of small firms involved in
defense procurement is the number of small procurements made in a given
period. In 1965 there were 13,321,602 procurement actions made by the
Defense Department. Only 158,786 of these were actions of $10,000 or
more—1.2% of the total. 1.2% of all procurement actions accounted for
68.9% of the dollar value of all defense contracts—some 24.2 billion
dollars. Each of those 158,786 "over $10,000" procurements actions
averaged over $153,000 each. The "less than $10,000" procurement actions
averaged about $300. Of these actions, 7,047,354 were made under the
"purchases not more than $2,500" exception to the competitive bidding
requirement clause of ASPR. There were 9,059,489 procurement actions
with "business firms" in the United States in 1965. Small business
received 6,202,493 of them for 68.5% of the total. Small business
received a substantial number of these contracts by negotiation.
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Figure 14 indicates that small businesses have consistently received
over 15% of the defense prime contract dollars. In recent years there
has been a gradual increase in the dollar value of contracts going to
small businesses. In 1965 it reached 19.6%. The uppermost curve of
Figure 14 is a very conservative estimate of the combined percentage of
the 100 largest firms and small business firms. These two sectors of
the Defense Industry account for some eighty percent of the total value
of all defense contracts.
The Secretary of Defense reported that small business garnered 18%
of the "over $10,000" prime contracts in 1964 and 20.3% in 1965. The
"top 100" firms received 73.4% and 68.9% respectfully in those years.
This would give the two sectors a total of 91.4% in 1964 and 89.1% in
1965 of the "over $10,000" prime contracts. Small business received
about 20% of the "under $10,000" contracts and the "top 100" firms also
received a substantial but unannounced portion. Firms larger than small
business received $1,264,307 of contracts of less than $10,000 value
each in 1965. The proportion of this that went to the top 100 firms is
not known.
Some of the factors which make for biggness in the defense industry
have been discussed. While the resulting concentration of power may not
be considered desirable by many, there is little evidence that it can be
avoided under present management practices. The total package procure-
ment plan may even reinforce it.
However, there seems to be another set of forces at work to insure
that a significant portion of the defense prime contracts goes to small
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businesses. It would hardly seem efficient to absorb the administrative
cost involved in handling some 10,000,000 small procurement actions each
year. Yet the Defense Department seems proud of the proliferation of
small contracts to small businesses.
With over 80% of the defense market going to the "top 100" firms
and small businesses, both of these sectors are deserving of closer




THE TITANS OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Who are the giants of the Defense Industry and how did they acquire
this stature? Based on factors already discussed one would expect them
to be firms which deal in the "hard goods" sector products, to have the
capacity of managing the production of entire weapon systems, and to be
capable of accommodating rapid technological change. Inasmuch as air-
craft, missiles and space, electronics and communications equipment con-
stitute some 70$ of the total defense market, a well balanced large de-
fense firm would produce in several of these sectors. Some very large
firms which produce mainly for the civilian sector and for which defense
contracting represents only a part of their activity could afford to be
less diversified in their defense production.
In World War II the large established firms of the United States
became the large defense firms simply by discontinuing a portion of their
civilian production and commencing production of defense materials. In
addition, the government built new production facilities and the establish-
ed firms provided the management to run these facilities. But this defense
industry was essentially abolished when the economy returned to peacetime
production.
Table 3 indicates that many of the "top 20" firms of World War II,
when ranked by the value of defense contracts received, have a markedly
lower ranking or are no longer among the "top 20" defense firms in I965.
93

Some, such as General Motors, DuPont and U.S. Steel, have chosen to
emphasize production in areas other than defense. Others, such as Packard
Motor Car have ceased to be major entities in either the civilian or de-
fense areas. Some, such as Raytheon and Hughes, have arrived in the
top 20 by virtue of specializing in new technology-electronics and
guided missiles.
TABLE 3 TWENTY LARGEST DEFENSE FIRMS
World War II
Rank Company Rank
1. General Motors 1
2. Curtis-Wright 2
3. Ford Motor 3
k. Consolidated Vultee h
5. Douglas Aircraft 5
6. United Aircraft 6
7. Bethlehem Steel 7
8. Chrysler 8
9- General Electric 9
10. Lockheed Aircraft 10
11. North American Aviation 11
12. Boeing Aircraft 12
13- American Telephone & Telegraph 13
14. Martin Company lk
15. Dupont 15
16. U.S. Steel 16
17. Bendix Aviation 17
18. Packard Motor Car 18
19. Sperry Corporation 19
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It has been pointed out that the top five or six firms capture about
25/o of the defense market in any given year. It will be useful to examine
briefly the "top 5" firms in I965 and one other lower ranking firm which
has been in the 'top 5" many times in recent years--Boeing Aircraft.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation- -Number One
Lockheed Aircraft and its subsidiary, Lockheed Shipbuilding and Con-
struction Company, received 7.1$ of the total value of the "over $10,000"
contracts awarded in I965. This amounted to $1.7 billion. Figures 16
and 17 show that Lockheed has enjoyed a steady and very rapid growth as
a defense contractor since 1957- By both dollar volume and percentage of
defense contract dollars, its share of the defense market has almost tri-
pled since 1957- This would indicate that Lockheed has purposefully under-
taken a program to be a very large and balanced defense contractor. This
was the fourth consecutive year that Lockheed was ranked as the number
one defense contractor. Its share of the market was only .6$ less than
the combined shares of the last fifty firms on the "top 100" list . (Fig-
ure 15) What does Lockheed produce that would afford such stability and
quantity?
Lockheed contracts for aircraft in I965 included the C-l4lA Star-
lifter Jet Cargo Transport, the C-130E Hercules Turboprop Jet Transport,
and the P}A Electra Turboprop Jet Patrol Bomber. In the missile field it
received contracts for Polaris and the follow-on Poseidon Missiles. In
the military space category, contracts were received for space vehicles
and research for a satellite control network. Its subsidiary produced
small ships for the Navy.
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Sales for 1964 were as follows:
Missile hardware and equipment $ 36h.Q million
Space Research and vehicles 272-3 "
Military and commercial aircraft 855-2
Ships, electronics, propulsion 108.7
Total Sales $1, 601.0 million
No less than 9k.k<%> of total sales resulted from United States govern-
mental contracts. The bulk of this was defense contracts. In addition
there were sales of defense products to foreign governments included in
the remaining 5.6%. Lockheed is a defense contractor in every sense of
the word. It produces in all major sectors of the defense hardware area--
aircraft, missiles, space , ships, and electronics.
During World War II Lockheed had been primarily an aircraft producer.
By the mid 1950' s it was well established as a producer of propeller driven
transport and jet fighter aircraft. It broadened its production to in-
clude missiles and space systems—a trend common to all major airframe
producers
.
In 1959 it purchased the Puget Sound Bridge and Dock Company. This
concern was an established builder of ships and also performed heavy con-
struction. In i960 it purchased Colby Crane and Manufacturing Company of
Seattle, Washington, and Vancouver, British Columbia. These two companies
have been combined and are now known as Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construc-
tion Company. It has already completed destroyer escorts and landing
ships for the Navy.
In 1959 Lockheed acquired Staved Engineering Company- -an electronics
firm. This has become the Lockheed Electronics Division.
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In i960 Lockheed gained control of Grand Central Rocket Company.
This has become the Lockheed Propulsion Division.
Thus, it would appear that Lockheed performed a massive horizontal
and vertical integration so as to span the entire spectrum of major de-
fense programs in depth. With the winning of the C5A contract in I966
it seems that its growth rate in the defense sector will continue.
Lockheed is one of the prime contenders in the supersonic transport
design competition which is under the auspices of the Federal Aviation
Authority. This program and the production of a civilian version of the
C5A, the L500, offer opportunities to escape the defense production area
This would seem to represent only an offshoot of defense work, but it
may represent the beginning of a concerted effort to diversify into the
civilian sector of the economy.
General Dynamics --Number Two
This firm's I965 defense contracts amounted to $1.18 billion--U.9^
of the total. This corporation was the first "space age" defense con-
tractor to develop a base broad enough that it could undertake work on
almost any weapon system the Defense Department selected. By 1957 it
had established itself as a producer of aircraft, missiles, electronic
and communication systems, and nuclear submaries. Its divisions include;
Convair - Airframes, space systems, missiles, rocket boosters.
Fort Worth - F-lll (TFX) Aircraft.
Canadair - Leading airframe producer in Canada.
Electric Boat - Nuclear submarines and electronic control systems.
General Atomics - Nuclear reactors and other nuclear systems.
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Electronics - Antisubmarine warfare systems, space tracking systems.
Stromberg-Carlson - Telephone switch boards and equipment, electronic
data processing equipment.
Material Services - Stone quarries, sand, gravel pits, construction
materials
.
Liquid Carbonic - Compressed gases of commercial and medical nature.
Electro Dynamics - Designer and producer of electric motors,
generators, etc.
From this spectrum of capability, General Dynamics appears to have
diversified into the civilian sector of the economy. Figures 16 and 17
indicates a fairly consistent percentage and dollar level in defense con-
tracts, but there is a declining trend in the past few years. In 196k
United States governmental sales constituted about 77$> of total sales.
At the present time General Dynamics may still be best described as one
of the giants of the Defense Industry and this will continue at least
through the production cycle of the F-lll aircraft series.
McDonnell Aircraft--Number Three
McDonnell Aircraft received $855-8 million or 3-5$ of the contracts
under consideration. The largest of McDonnell's prime contracts was for
the F-k Phantom II jet fighter-bomber. This aircraft is performing yeo-
man service, particularly in Viet Nam, for all three of the major tactical
air services— the Air Force, Navy and Marines. It is being purchased in
far greater quantities than originally programmed and McDonnell's share
of the defense market would be much less were it not for the unforseen
follow-on orders for the F-^ caused by the Viet Nam War.
McDonnell has three subsidiary firms— Glass Technology, Hycon Manu-
facturing Company, and Tridea Electronics, Incorporated. Although this
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affords a somewhat broader base for defense contracting, it appears Mc-
Donnell is making an effort to diversify into the non-military space and
civilian industry sectors. It has already established itself as a pro-
ducer of space vehicles. McDonnell has recently established a separate
division to provide electronic data processing services to industry.
Although it has been in the "top five" for two consecutive years,
McDonnell does not seem to qualify as a broad gage growing stalwart of
the Defense Industry. Figures 16 and 17 indicate this rank is a gross
departure from past trends. It is caused by one product which does not
have a follow-on in immediate prospect. It is expected that this firm's
position will drop quickly as the F-h program tapers off.
General Electric Company- -Number Four
This firm garnered $83^-3 million of defense contracts or J.kfy of
the total in 1965. About kO<fo of the total awards were for jet engines.
Missiles accounted for the next largest increment, and the remainder of
the contracts were for weapons, electronics and communications equipment,
and nuclear propulsion systems for naval ships.
General Electric represents a different kind of defense contractor.
While its defense contracts represent a major share of the defense mar-
ket, they represent a small part of the firm's total sales—about 17$
in I96U. General Electric has had the most consistent percentage and
dollar share of the defense market of all major defense contractors under
consideration (Figures 16 and 17). This would seem to indicate a top
level management decision to keep defense contracting as a consistent but
100

relatively minor part of the overall corporation activity, with emphasis
on civilian production.
General Electric is unique in another aspect. Its position as a
major manufacturer of jet engines is a direct outgrowth of its long ex-
perience in turbine design and production technology. The steam driven
turbines which General Electric, and Westinghouse for that matter, had
built to turn electric generators and power ships for many years prior
to the development of the jet engine afforded a solid base on which to
develop this new technology.
Years of experience as a leader in electronics made its postwar ex-
pansion in both the burgeoning civilian and military electronic fields
relatively low-risk high-gain endeavors.
The nuclear ship propulsion activity was a logical outgrowth of the
above cited turbine experience and the continuous sponsoring and managing
of large technical research programs. Activity in all of these defense
areas was supported by, and in turn supported, other programs within the
company.
General Electric is a firm which is in no way dependent on its de-
fense business to remain one of the corporate giants of American Industry.
In I963 its total sales of $^.8 billion ranked it as the sixth largest
firm in the United States, yet it has not become one of the major "weapon
systems management" contractors. While over twice as large as General
Dynamics and Lockheed in terms of annual sales, and over four times as
large in assets in 1963, General Electric had about half their amount of
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defense business. Once again this would appear to be a well calculated
decision. There seems to be little question that General Electric has
both the management skills and the physical and monetary assets to cap-
ture a larger share of the market should such action be deemed desirable
by its top management.
North American Aviat ion--Number Five
This firm's share of the 1965 defense market was $7^5.8 million or
3.1$ of the total. This included contracts for aircraft, missile pro-
pulsion equipment, a wide variety of electronics equipment including
missile guidance and control systems, and naval ship's navigational
systems
.
Several of North American's aircraft programs are phasing out, in-
cluding the Air Force B-70 and the Navy's A-5- A new program for a coun-
terinsurgency light attack aircraft (COIN) will absorb some of this capa-
city. However the magnitude of this program will not afford the dollar
volume of either terminating program.
North American has the following divisions:
Los Angeles - Aircraft and Aerospace development and manufacturing.
Columbus, Ohio - Aircraft development and manufactuing control
systems, and radio telescopes.
Atomics International - Nuclear reactors and nuclear technological
research
.
Autonetics - Automatic navigation systems, flight control and
armament systems, computers, and other electronics work.
Rocketdyne - Large and small rocket engines.
Science Center - Basic research in physical, chemical and mathe-
matical sciences.
Space and Information Systems - Missiles, manned and unmanned
spacecraft, and information processing systems.
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The firm has moved into the non-military space program to a con-
siderable degree. There is a recent emphasis on information handling
and electronic data processing work for other firms of industry and muni-
cipal and Federal Government agencies. This latter effort has also
been undertaken by Lockheed and McDonnell.
North American has a broad base in the defense area and will pro-
bably continue as one of the major firms of the Defense Industry.
Boeing Company-Number Eight
This firm received contracts in the amount of $2.13 billion in 1958
or 9.8/0 of the total. The contracts included B-52 and KC-135 and the
Bomarc Missile. This amazingly large sum was a radical departure from
the previous and succeeding years. (Figures 16 and 17)
Since that time there has been a gradual downward trend in percentage
and dollar value of defense contracts. In I965 Boeing received $583-4
million or 2.4% of the defense market and dropped to eighth in rank. How-









During those years its defense business had been almost entirely in
missiles and aircraft. Aircraft have included everything from the giant
B-52 Strategic bomber, to the CH-47A Chinook Troop Transport helicopters,
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Missiles ranged from the Minuteman ICBM to the Bomarc Anti-Aircraft
missile
.
Its major division in 1964 were:
Aero Space - Minuteman, boosters.
Commercial Aircraft - 707, 720, 727, 773 series civilian transports.
Military Aircraft - B-52, KC-135, CH-46A, CH-47.
Industrial Products - Navy Patrol Craft, Navy Hydrofoils.
Boeing received an early start in the civilian jet air transport
field because of its production, engineering, and design expertise gain-
ed under B- 1+7 and KC-135 contracts for the Air Force. Its first jet air-
liner, the 707, is very similar to the KC-135. It proved to be a fine
design and Boeing commanded much of the early market for such aircraft.
The firm has since aggressively pursued the development of a full spectrum
of jet airliners. The latest of this series are the C5A design product,
the 7^-7, and Boeing's entry in the supersonic transport competition, the
773-
On December 31, 1964, Boeing had unfilled orders for jet airliners
in the amount of $1.8 billion. If Boeing's 773 design is successful and
the 7^-7 proves to be a commercial success, defense contracting will pro-
bably become a progressively smaller part of Boeing sales. Whether this
is the ploy of management after losing the C5A and TFX competitions, or
just the logical result of technical capacity combined with market oppor-
tunity is unclear. But for the foreseeable future Boeing will continue




Among the very large firms examined, several different types can be
identified:
(1) Firms which are well diversified within the defense industry
and dealing in all major components of the hard goods sectors--air-
craft, missiles and space, electronics and communications, and
naval ships. Lockheed and General Dynamics are typical.
(2) Firms which have the capability of producing many of the com-
ponents of the hard goods sector but in which defense production
is a sideline of major corporate activity. General Electric is
such a firm.
(3) Firms which have been very successful as a defense contractor
but are moving into other sectors of the economy including non-
military space programs. Boeing is the best example of this. How-
ever all large defense contractors, with the exception of those who
handle defense contracting as a sideline, seem to be making some
effort in this direction. This is their only hedge against a suc-
cessful disarmament program.
The high degree of concentration in the defense industry is the re-
sult of many interdependent factors. The continuing cold war confron-
tation between the United States and the Soviet Union and Communist
China dictated a requirement for military power. Advancing technology
created very complex weapons necessary for that military power which ex-
ceeded existing management capabilities insofar as development and
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procurement were concerned. The new management concepts of "weapon sys-
tems and "weapon system management" required management teams which ex-
ceeded the Defense Department's in house capabilities. Efficiency in
procurement under this condition could only be gained by contracting the
bulk of the weapon systems production cycle management to industrial
firms. The only industrial firms that could undertake such endeavors
were very large ones. Technology continued to create more sophisticated
weapon systems and contracts grew in size. Certain firms became expert
in this type of management and had access to the means of production.
These were, and are, the titans of the Defense Industry.
There is mobility in the ranks of the Defense Industry. Technologi-
cal advances will assist some firms in becoming larger as other firms
are reduced in importance. New firms will enter the defense market as
others choose to leave, or are forced out.
However, the degree of concentration probably will not vary unless
the Defense Department makes the decision to expand tremendously and
undertake the top level weapon systems production management in house.
The problems created by such an effort would be many. Messrs. Hitch,
Scherer, and Peck have all stated the difficulty encountered in keeping
in government the required numbers and quality of personnel to meet
even present day requirements. (32:229 and 5^:80) Under present govern-
mental pay and working conditions the problem of attracting the additional
suitable management personnel would probably serve as a major roadblock.
But suppose the required staff could be assembled. To prevent this
governmental "weapon system procurement team" from being superimposed
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on industry teams, and to assist in the splintering of the defense
market, weapon systems would have to be contracted for by separate com-
ponents. Final assembly would have to be done under direct government
supervision and perhaps in government facilities. This probably would
be inefficient as well as contrary to the presently stated concepts of
free -enterprise.
What all of this would amount to is an even greater degree of con-
centration of the defense procurement effort, but it would be within a
governmental agency. If the political implications of this were not
disagreeable to the Congress and the taxpayers, then the economic in-
efficiency probably would be.
Thus, there does not appear to be an easy or economically efficient





SMALL BUSINESS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Thus far considerable reference has been made to "small business."
In almost all data released by the Defense Department concerning the
awarding of contracts one sees specific mention of small businesses'
share. Although small business receives about one fifth of the defense
prime contract dollars, the statistical data concerning its share is
usually more complete than that concerning the dozen or less firms that
capture half of the market. This would indicate that small business is
an area of special concern--and indeed it is.
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on
Small Business stated the following in a message concerning the passage
of the Small Business Act by the Congress in 1958.
"The significance of this legislation, so long sought
by members of the Senate Small Business Committee, is
that it signalizes the acceptance by the Congress of
small business as a distinct and vital element of the
national economy . On thus formalizing a philosophic
concept first given tangible expression by the creation
of the Smaller War Plants Corporation in the early
days of World War II, Congress has now made it clear
that independent small business enterprises are to
be considered as one of this Nation's invaluable
resources— as essential to our strength as our
fertile farmlands, timber, mines, and waterway
systems." (Underlining provided) (72)
This legislation made the Small Business Agency a permanent part of
the Federal Government. As he notes, small business had formally become
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a matter of public interest in early World War II. Actually, the real
beginning of the active liaison between the Federal Government and small
business can be traced to early 1938 when President Roosevelt invited the
rank and file" of small businessmen to a conference in Washington, D.C.
Professor John Bunzel's book The American Small Businessman gives an
excellent account of that conference as well as the modern political and
philosophical milieu of small business in general. (12)
Small businesses have always existed in this country. In fact big
business is the more recent arrival having gained its stature in the
post-Civil War to World War I period. Comparatively recently, small
business has taken on a value in society that is somewhat apart from its
strictly economic contribution.
Bunzel gives excellent treatment to the development of the ideologi-
cal aura which surrounds small business. The essentials of his case are
that the United States as a young agrarian nation had deeply instilled
in its national personality the notion of the "family farmer." This
concept finds its roots best expressed in Thomas Jefferson's writings.
As the country became more industrialized and family size farms a lesser
force in the economy and the American scene in general, the small busi-
nessman fell heir to the ideological role of "the basic American insti-
tution.
It is interesting to note how much of the present-day legislation
concerning farming and agriculture is predicated on values that have
long since lost their economic reality. Homestead laws of the last
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century made one quarter of the surveyor's section--l60 acres--a permanent
fixture in legislation concerning agriculture. Water for irrigation
purposes, in areas supplied by the United States Bureau of Reclamation,
is presently allocated on the basis of 160 acre farms in spite of the
fact that in many affected localities it would take one thousand acres
of land to make an economically viable farm. Although the concept of
the small family size farm is no longer technologically or economically
viable, it is cleaved to still as rigidly as the classic "mother love,
flag and country."
As the country industrialized and people left the farm, the image
of the small entrepreneur became embellished with many of the virtues
historically associated with the family farmer . Although Jefferson was
an anti-industrialist he would now find many of his philosophical ideals
concerning farmers transplanted to small industrialist as well as other
small businessmen.
Senator Sparkman was not alone in the Congress in considering small
business as a primary national resource. Section 2 of the Small Business
Act reads as follows:
The essence of the American economic system of
private enterprise is free competition. Only through
full and free competition can free markets, free entry
into business, and opportunities for the expression
and growth of personal initiative and individual judg-
ment be assured. The preservation and expansion of
such competition is basic not only to the economic
well-being but to the security of this Nation. Such
security and well-being cannot be realized unless the
actual and potential capacity of small business is
encouraged and developed. It is the declared policy
of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel,
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assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the
interests of small-business concerns in order to
preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure
that a fair proportion of the total purchases and
contracts or subcontracts for property and services
for the Government (including but not limited to
contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair,
and construction) be placed with small-business
enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of
the total sales of Government property be made
to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen
the overall economy of the Nation .
Further, it is the declared policy of the
Congress that the Government should aid and assist
victims of floods and other catastrophes, and small-
business concerns which are displaced as a result
of federally aided construction programs,
(underlining provided) (73)
Section 3 of the Act defines small business as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, a small-business
concern shall be deemed to be one which is independ-
ently owned and operated and which is not dominant
in its field of operation. In addition to the fore-
going criteria the Administrator, in making a detailed
definition may use these criteria, among others:
number of employees and dollar volume of business.
Where the number of employees is used as one of the
purposes of this Act, the maximum number of employees
which a small-business concern may have under the
definition shall vary from industry to industry to
the extent necessary to reflect differing character-
istics of such industries and to take proper account
of other relevant factors. (73)
The Small Business Administration has drawn a more specific definition
based on this provision of the law.
A manufacturing concern is considered small
if its average employment in the preceding four
calendar quarters was 250 or fewer persons, in-
cluding employees of affiliates, and is considered
large if its average employment in this period
was more than 1,000 persons. If its average
employment was more than 250 but not more than
1,000 persons, it may be considered either small
or large, depending on the employment size which
the SBA has developed for its particular industry.
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A wholesale concern is classified as small
if its yearly sales are $5,000,000 or less.
Most retail and service trades concerns
are considered small if their yearly sales or
receipts are $1,000,000 or less. The maximum
for those selling general merchandise, motor
vehicles or groceries with fresh meats is
$2,000,000.
A hotel, power laundry, or trucking and ware-
housing concern is small if its annual receipts
are $2,000,000 or less, and a concern primarily
engaged in construction is small if its average
receipts for the preceding 3 years are $5,000,000
or less. (73)
It can be seen that with guidance such as this there is much room
for interpretation. Even so, it is obvious that the generic term small
business takes in a considerable part of the economic activity of the
United States—everything from one man shoeshine stands to incorporated
wholesale firms with annual sales of $5,000,000.
TABLE 4 TYPES OF FIRMS IN THE U.S.
Sole Active Active
Proprietorships Partnerships Corporations
19^5 5.7 Million .627 Million .421 Million
1953 7.71 " • 959 .698
11
1957 8.7^ " • 971 .9lt0
it
1958 8.80 " 9^ • 990 11
1959 9.1U • 9^9 1.07
11
i960 9.10 .9Ul 1.14
11
1961 9.2U 939 1.19
11
1962 9.18 • 932 1.27
11
ource: U.S. Business Tax Returns FY 1963 U. S. Treasury Depar
Table k indicates the numbers and type of firms in the United States
It is not feasible to classify precisely these by "small business" and
"big business" groupings because of the uncertainty of what constitutes
a small business. However the table will give an appreciation of how
firms have proliferated in the United States and why small business is
a politically active subject.
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Over four million of these firms are farms. Of the remaining firms
it is reasonable to assume that the large majority of sole proprietorships
and active partnerships could qualify as small business. A lesser per-
centage of the corporations would also qualify. Therefore, there are
probably some seven million non-farm firms in the United States that fall
into the small business category.
The tenor of the relationship between the Congress and the Defense
Department in respect to small business is suggested by Section 10 (d)
of the Small Business Act. It requires that the Department of Defense
report monthly to the President, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the "Amount of funds . . .
which have been expended, obligated, or contracted to be spent with
small-business concerns and the amount of funds expended, obligated, or
contracted to be spent with firms other than small business in the same
field of operation . . . ." (73)
On April 27, 196l, just a few months after taking office, Secretary
McNamara appeared before the Government Procurement Subcommittee of the
Senate's Small Business Committee. He stated that President Kennedy had
asked him, a few days after taking office, to see if small business pro-
grams in defense procurement could be stepped up. The Secretary also
commented on how the heavy buying of large weapon systems between 1956
and i960 had caused a considerable drop in small business participation.
He assured the Committee that he had implemented within the Defense De-
partment an aggressive program to reverse this trend.
113

There were three main facets to this program. All of these were
essentially no more than greater emphasis on programs already underway.
The first was to increase the number of contracts which were suitable in
respect to scope and materials required, for small business participation
More procurement contracts were created by "breaking out" components or
subassemblies and contracting directly for them, but with delivery to
the system manager. In addition there was better publication of needs,
wider advertising for bids, and active solicitation of bids from small
business when circumstances permitted.
The second procedure for increasing small business participation was
through encouraging more subcontracting by the prime contractors. Con-
tractual requirements, agency pressure, and purely voluntary programs
were all used to increase the volume of subcontracting to small business.
The third means was to increase the "set-aside" of procurements for
competition among small businesses only. The "set-aside" program was not
new having been required by law for several years.
Figure 18 demonstrates that since 1962, the first year which would
reflect the McNamara program, there has been a gradual and reasonably
consistent rise in the dollar value of direct contracts awarded small
business. Figure 19 indicates a more noticeable increase in respect to
the percentage of the value of contracts with all business firms for
work in the United States. This is due to the fact that while the total
value of such contracts decreased by almost $1 billion in I965, small
businesses 1 share increased by over $.4 billion. The program seems to











VALUE OF DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACTS TO
BUSINESS FIRMS FOR WORK IN USA
SMALL BUSINESS
j I J I I I J L J_
1953 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
30%
FIGURE 19.
PERCENTAGE OF CONTRACT VALUE SHOWN BY FIGURE IB
20
I
SMALL BUSINESS % OF TOTAL
J I 1 L J L
1953 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
SOURCE ! MILITARY PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS FY 1965
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Senator William Proxmire, Democrat from Wisconsin, is a member of
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the Senate Appropriation
Committee, and the Congressional Joint Economic Committee. He is also
Chairman of both the Small Business Subcommittee of the Senate Banking
Committee and the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint
Economic Committee. The Senator recently authored a book entitled Can
Small Business Survive? (55) In this book he concludes that "small
businessmen have a tough road ahead" but can survive with sufficient
help from the Federal Government. The following is based on his book
and an interview he granted the writer March 19, 1966.
The Senator notes in his book that President Kennedy had asked the
Defense Department to increase its direct contracts with small business
by 10$. He acknowledges that this was accomplished in 1962. However,
the attitude he attributes to the Defense Department concerning small
business is entirely different from the one demonstrated by Secretary
McNamara before the Government Procurement Subcommittee cited above. He
devotes several pages developing the background of a small business sub-
contracting law which was enacted September 26, I96I. This law provides
the basis for the Small Business Administration's role in monitoring
Defense Department contracting policies in respect to small business.
Senator Sparkman had introduced the bill originally May 21, 1959- It
provided that it would be government policy to award a fair share of
contracts and subcontracts for property and services to small business.
It also provided that the Defense Department had to furnish the Small
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Business Administration more complete procurement records and give them
access to procurement negotiation and award-board materials. It would
have also extended the "set-aside" program to subcontracts.
Senator Proxmire recounts that "the bill, however, met with immedi-
ate Department of Defense disapproval." As chairman of the Small Busi-
ness Subcommittee of the Banking Committee he chaired the hearings on
the proposed legislation. His subcommittee favorably reported the legis-
lation with a more definitive small business subcontracting program
amendment
.
The full committee, after several minor technical revisions,
unanimously reported the bill. Section 8 of this bill was considered
by Senator Proxmire "to insure that small business concerns would partici-
pate equitably as prime contractors and subcontractors in government
procurement contracts.' He reports that: "Section 8 passed the Senate
unanimously! But then the opposition really went to work. The Pentagon
pressured the House Conference to kill the Amendment ." (underlining pro-
vided) (55:207) The bill was re-introduced and eventually passed in a
different form in I96I.
Senator Proxmire remarked that: " in the face of this adamant opposi -
tion on the part of the Pentagon , as well as the enforced 'going along'
of the SBA, Congress finally passed the Administration Amendment."
(underlining provided) He does not feel the I96I law was adequate and
vows that "Senator Sparkman and I are going to press for our more hard-
hitting effective program. To accomplish this we may have to knock a
few heads together. After my experience and frustrations with guiding
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the present program through Congress, I might enjoy it." (55:211)
It is appreciated that the book is written at least in part for
personal political purposes and for that reason the language may be
considered slightly exaggerative. It is probably a matter of form to
promote the image of Senator David" engaging the faceless masses of
the Goliath Pentagon." However, after hearing the Senator discuss these
issues there is little doubt that he has a sincere and abiding interest
in promoting the cause of small business.
It also should be pointed out that the Senator's opinion of Secre-
tary McNamara appeared to be quite high and not in keeping with the above
quotes concerning the Pentagon. The increase of small business' share
in 1965 by 22$> over the I96I figure will not diminish that opinion.
The issue of Congressional and Pentagon relations is reserved for
the next chapter. However at this point, it will be of interest to
consider some of the hazards encountered even by the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Economic Statistics in performing the analysis at hand
with statistics that are provided by the Defense Department.
Senator Proxmire at one point in his book stated that:
The high point of small business participation in
defense prime contracts awards was 25-3 Per cent in
fiscal 195^- This percentage has declined each year
until fiscal I96I when it had fallen to 15-9 per cent.
In fiscal 1962, 100 of the largest corporations re-
ceived 72.3 per cent of the net value of military
prime contract awards made by the Department of
Defense. (55:202)
The 25.3/o cited for fiscal year 195^ is the percentage of the dollar
value of contracts only with business firms for work in the United States
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This does not include contracts with educational and other non-profit
institution or work outside the United States. While this 25-3$ sounds
like a substantial amount and does represent a large increase over the
I6.670 figure of the previous year, it really amounts to a decrease in
dollar value of $1.7 billion. This anomaly is clearly demonstrated by
Figures 18 and 19. The long term decrease in percentage cited by the
Senator is accurate but the dollar value of small business contracts
actually increased from 195^ through I96I by $.755 billion. While both
sets of data are pertinent they should be considered in joinder to ap-
preciate the participation of small business.
The 72.37o figure cited is the percentage of military prime contracts
of $10,000 or more, and not the "net value of military prime contract
awards. These contracts include research and development work with
educational and other non-profit institutions and work outside the United
States. These contracts totaled $25-588 billion. The value of all
defense procurement in fiscal year I962 was $29-25^ billion. This
included $1,156 billion of intragovernmental procurement. The $18,497
billion of contracts of $10,000 or over "awarded the 100 large firms"
represents 63% of the total procurement. If the intragovernmental
segment is deleted then the amount "100 large firms" received is a little
less than 6670 of the total.
However, the difficulty does not end there because businesses,
other than small business, received over $1.3 billion in contracts of
less than $10,000 in I96U and 1965. There is no way of telling how much
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of this went to the 100 largest firms. It is for these reasons that
the plot of the combined shares of the "top 100 firms" and small busi-
nesses shown in Figure 13 is titled as an estimate rather than a precise
quantity.
It has been noted that both Senator Proxmire and Secretary McNamara
pointed out that the practice of buying "weapon systems" had a direct
effect on small businesses 1 share of the defense market. It also has
been remarked earlier that the Air Force is the primary buyer of larger
systems. It is the most "hardware intensive" of the three services.
The Navy with ships, submarines, and tactical aircraft is also hardware
or system" intensive. Historically the Army has been "personnel inten-
sive," and although it, too, is using greater quantity of more sophisti-
cated hardware than ever before, it is still more dependent on direct
human employment of individuals than the other services.
Figure 20 reflects these differences. The Army consistently con-
tracts less with business firms than either the Navy or Air Force. The
Navy has held a middle position in such contracting. However with the
increasing importance of aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines it
appears to be gradually approaching the Air Force level of contracting
which is decreasing. The Air Force's contracting effort is the largest
of the three, and the most erratic. One large missile or space contract
can have a pronounced effect on its annual rate. Because of this, and
the substantial portion of total funds contracted by the Air Force, there
is a noticeable positive correlation between Air Force contract amounts
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If systems procurement" is indeed detrimental to contracting with
small businesses then it would be expected that the Air Force would have
the smallest percentage of such contracts, the Navy the next smallest
and the Army the largest.
Figures 22 and 23 show that this is indeed the case. The Army also
had the highest dollar value until I963 in spite of its lesser hardware
expenditures and still has the highest percentage of the three military
departments
.
The Defense Supply Agency, another McNamara era innovation, buys
materials that are required by all three services. It has consistently
awarded more than k&fo of the total value of all its contracts to small
business. In spite of this agency assuming procurement responsibilities
of all the services for many of the materials that lend themselves well
to small business procurement, all of the military services have been
able to maintain or slightly increase the value of their small business
contracts since I963. (Figure 22) There is a commensurate performance
in the percentage of contracts value also. (Figure 23)
The overall decreasing trend shown by the percentage of small busi-
ness contracts let by the Army prior to I963 can be accounted for by its
modernization program. The quest for greater fire-power and mobility
caused the need for more elaborate firearms as well as mechanized equip-
ment, helicopters, and aircraft. As the proportion of its purchases for
these latter items increased, the contracts suitable for small business
decreased. However, the data since I963 indicate the "small business"
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1963 453 11, 411
1964 617 9,278
1965 601 8,490
In addition to the efforts to diffuse direct or prime contracts
among the small businesses, the program to cause subcontracts to go to
small business has been aggressively pursued. Table 5 indicates the
results of their program.
TABLE 5 - DEFENSE FIRMS SUBCONTRACTING PROGRAMS 1958-1965
Fiscal Large Firms Military Sub Small Other /o to Small









Source: Military Price Contract Awards FY 1965, Office of SecDef
It should be noted that the results shown in this table are dependent
on the large firms reporting how they awarded subcontracts. It is also
noteworthy that as the percentage climbed after I963, the dollar value
decreased
.
We have noted the interests of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and members of Congress in insuring that small business gets
a substantial share of defense dollars either through direct or sub-
contracts. In I965 alone, there was $16,242 billion worth of contracts
publicized to small business. This was 64. 3/ of all the contracts let
to business firms for work in the United States. Yet small business won
only $4,942 billion or 36.4/1 of the amount publicized. It bid unsuccess-
fully on $2,669 billion or l6.4/o of the total. It did not submit bids
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on $8,489 billion or 52.3$ of the available contracts. This would indi-
cate that if small business is to increase its share, something must be
done besides publicizing the procurements to them.
In a study done by Schrieber, Marcus, Sutermeister , and Brown, at
the University of Washington in i960, and reported in a book entitled
Defense Procurement and Small Business , it is noted that small business'
men prefer negotiated to advertised procurement. Table 6 presents a
typical response pattern when small defense contractors were queried
concerning this point. (63:2k)










Privately Designed 2 Valves
New Missile Design
First Production of Missile
The reason for the high preferance for negotiation and the reason
why over 50/o of the available contract dollars advertised to small busi-
ness were not bid on are probably the same. Bids on government contracts
cost a good deal of money to prepare. If the bid is lost the money spent
on bid preparation must be absorbed as a loss. If the bid is won, the
cost of preparing the bid can reduce profits markedly. This, combined
with the risk of winning a bid based on a poorly prepared proposal that
results in a loss, makes the cost of risk too high for many, if not most
of the small businessmen.
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This problem was stated rather well by a representative of the
Strategic Industries Association, a group of small defense contractors,
when testifying before the Government Procurement Subcommittee of the
Senate Small Business Committee.
To the general SIA membership, the paper profusion
problem is a matter of grave concern. The typical SIA
member is, by definition, a small businessman. As such,
he has limited resources allotable to the administrative
aspects of his company. Therefore, any unusual burden,
outside the technical aspect of his products, poses a
threat to the balance of his organizational structure.
Too often it is not recognized that competence in an
esoteric technical field does not imply organizational
capacity to cope with elaborate and entangled adminis-
trative systems.
Therein lies the rub for the small businessman,
and therein lies the crux of the paper profusion prob-
lem as related to the small businessman. The prime
contractors pass down, unadulterated, the majority of
contractual and administrative system requirements
which the procuring agency deems necessary for program
support. Applicable as these administrative system
requirements may be on the prime contractor level, the
same requirements entangle the small businessman, or
subcontractor, in a hopeless mass of paper and confusion.
Bear in mind that the subcontractor generally is supply-
ing a component which is only incidental to the overall
success of the program.
Even so, he is required to either possess or
initiate control systems indentical to those employed
by the primes and which satisfy contractual requirements.
While the prime contractor is properly funded to main-
tain such systems, the subcontractor can expect no com-
pensation at all.
Understandably, the terms "administrative systems"
and "contractual requirements" are vague. To elucidate
what the subcontractor faces in his battle with the
paper profusion problem, it is necessary to expose
certain procurement program details to micro view. The
C-5A procurement program is a good example.
By way of background, engineering, and technical
concepts have traditionally been the criteria for pro-
duct, and supplier, acceptance or rejection. During the
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C-5A program definition phase however, a new set
of criteria evolved which has placed equal emphasis
on heretofore unequal subcontractor attributes. Speci-
fically, the administrative areas of program control,
quality assurance, contracts, configuration manage-
ment, logistics support, subcontracts, and major sys-
tems control, have attained equal status, in terms of
authority, with the creative engineering functions.
This authority shift quite naturally resulted in
the various functions seeking to establish themselves
as entities. Of course, the best method of accomplish-
ing this goal is to write specifications and establish
requirements which must be met before the program can
proceed past that particular administrative function.
These specifications and requirements were written
around Government contract requirements, sometimes
enlarged to suit the purpose, and become standards
for both internal and external use. The net result
is that, in addition to the traditional engineering
specification, a typical request for proposal issued
by a prime contractor now includes a profusion of
administrative specifications and requirements. More-
over, these specifications and requirements that
were originally designed to satisfy the prime contrac-
tor's contractual requisites, flow down undiluted to
subcontractors at all levels in the form of a bid
package
.
The impact of these passed down requirements is
hard felt by the subcontractor at bid time. The bid
packaged often weighs more than the product being
proposed. (71:256)
Thus, as well as seeing the problem stated, it can be seen that the
Charles Plan has very direct implications on the small business program.
It would seem that the Defense Department finds itself in the position
of trying to promote efficiency in its very large procurements at the
expense of its program to diffuse subcontracts throughout the world of
small business. Or perhaps it may be said that a substantial part of
the economies possible under the total package procurement concept are
vitiated by the small business program. The anomaly is real. However,
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the treatment of this problem cannot be accomplished within the per-
spective of the Defense Department. It must be viewed from the larger
framework of relations between the Defense Department, Congress, and




THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, CONGRESS, AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Based on the facts and data presented in the earlier chapters there
is little question that there is pronounced concentration in the defense
industry. The attempts by the Defense Department to promote efficiency
in its large weapon systems procurements will not weaken this concentration
and probably will foster it. At the same time an aggressive program to
insure that small business has a substantial share of the defense market
is being pursued.
This small business program is difficult to justify from the stand-
point of managerial or economic efficiency unless its overall impact is
considered. The total number of defense procurement actions increased
from 11,898,919 in 1964 to 13,312,602 in 1965. Procurement actions of
less than $10,000 increased from 11,750,864 to 13,162,816 in this period
and actions of over $10,000 increased from 148,055 to 158,786. The value
of all procurement actions was $28,796 billion in 1964, but in spite of
the increased number of procurement actions in 1965, the value of all
procurement actions dropped to $27,997 billion. The value of the under
$10,000 procurement actions increased by less than 6% from 1964 to 1965
—
$3,131 billion to $3,311 billion. However, the percentage of procurement
actions of this size increased by almost 12%. The value of the "over
$10,000" contracts decreased from $25,665 billion in 1964 to $24,686
billion while the number procurement actions increased by over 7%.
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The previously cited increase of the small business share of the
defense contracts with firms in the United States from 17.2% in 1964 to
19.6% in 1965 is accounted for by its increased share of the "over
$10,000" contracts. This increase from 13.3% to 15.5% probably stems
from the intensified "break-out" and "set-aside" programs. During this
same period small business 's share of the total dollar value of contracts
for less than $10,000 actually decreased from 51.5% to 51%.
Although the purpose of reducing systems and other large procurement
packages into components is to increase the number of procurement actions
suitable for small businesses, the increased number of procurement actions
in the 1964-1965 period was not accompanied by a proportionally commensur-
ate increase in small business participation. In fact, the decreased
percentage of under $10,000 contracts going to small business is cause
for wonder.
In 1964 there were 6,645,556 procurements made under the "Purchases
of not more than $2,500" exception to competitive bidding clause of the
ASPR. This accounted for 71.5% of all procurement actions other than
intragovernmental ones. The total value of these procurements was $1,338
billion or an average of about $200 each. In 1965 the procurements under
this authority increased to 7,047,354, and the value increased to $1,393
billion. The average value of each procurement action decreased to $187.
The purpose of this exception to the competitive bidding clause is
to avoid the costs associated with formal competitive procedures.
However, the source for all of the foregoing data citations is a product
of the Secretary of Defense's Office and it states concerning these
130

procurements: "Price competition required on all actions of $250 or more."
This means that although it is not required by law, some kind of compe-
tition is required by Defense Department policy for those procurements of
less than $2500 but over $250.
In 1954 the writer personally undertook a study to fix the cost to
the government for handling procurement documents. A one page change to
an existing contract cost over $35. The simplist original procurement
document studied, a one page "letter of intent," cost over $100 just to
the point of mailing it to the contractor. It is doubted that these costs
have lessened appreciably. If this may be used as a working figure, the
preparation and administration of documents for purchases made under the
"less than $2500" clause in 1965 alone would cost over $700,000,000! If
all 1965 procurement actions are considered this cost would amount to
$L33 billion. The falacies of such a generalized extension are obvious,
but there is one point that is certain. The administrative costs for
handling over 13,000,000 procurement documents a year is formidable.
There appears to be a marked tendency to increase the proliferation
of procurement actions. Small business programs may account for some of
this increase but certainly not all. There are two immediately plausible
explanations
.
(1) There is "empire building" in the procurement offices which
requires greater numbers of procurement actions to justify
growth* and
(2) There is a tendency on the part of procurement officers to break
procurements into smaller increments so that they may avail
themselves of the flexibility of the "less than $2500" clause.
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It would seem other forces may have preempted the procedures which were
instituted to assist small businesses.
The goals of the small business programs are well delineated,
affirmative in nature, and represent the clearly defined values described
in chapter VII. There is a substantial price tag that goes with the
promotion of these values. This includes not only the increased cost of
administering the additional contracts created, but also that of increased
coordination effort, transportation, and some loss of economies of scale.
Many specific examples of how things are bought more cheaply by dealing
with small businesses are cited by the Defense Department but it is
considered that the overall program, with all of its non-publicized costs,
actually increases the total cost of defense procurement. However, the
program serves to discourage a kind of vertical integration by large
defense firms—that of absorbing their subcontractors or increasing their
own in-house capabilities at the expense of subcontracting.
Nor is small business the only program written into law which is at
cross purposes with economic efficiency in defense procurement. There
are programs such as "Buy American" and "aid to labor distressed areas"
as well as other requirements which must be considered in each procurement
action. The full complexity of the factors surrounding defense procurement
is appreciated when one considers the various facets that have been
discussed. The procurement official is supposed to buy only what is
needed, in its simplest non-gold plated form, at the lowest sound price,
under conditions of competition, insuring timely delivery of good quality
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and standardized products, but insuring at the same time that proper
consideration is given to small business, labor distressed areas,
"buying American" and maintaining an industrial mobilization base. It
is obvious that many Congressional and Executive Branch values other
than economic efficiency are being protected and promoted. In a strict
sense all of these diverse and conflicting considerations constrain the
Defense Department from optomizing the defense posture gained from the
resources allocated.
The discussion at this point has ceased to be concerned with just
the Defense Department. It has become a commentary on the United States
system of government. It now is necessary to consider the Defense Depart-
ment in the more general framework of the Federal Government. In so doing,
the third hypothesis stated in Chapter One, that "there are countervailing
forces in the Congress and the remainder of the Federal Government which
serve to deter further centralization of the defense industry," will be
treated.
The decision by the United States government to maintain large
defense forces is primarily a political one. Von Clausewitz's dictum that
"war is a continuation of politics by other means" is germane. By exten-
sion, the capacity to make war has come to be considered as an essential
political tool in today's international environment. However, the price
of this political decision must be measured in terms of national economic
resources. While all national political decisions are not necessarily
economic decisions as well, it is difficult to imagine a national economic
decision that is not also a political decision.
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The allocation of tremendous quantities of the nation's resources
to defense represents a truly momentous national decision. Yet it is not
a decision that has been made by economists. There is very little compre-
hensive and integrated economic planning done at the national level in
the United States. The long deceased National Resources Planning Board
of President Franklin Roosevelt's Administration was noted mostly for its
lack of effectiveness. The only times national planning has been partially
effective were when it was on an ad hoc basis and during times of national
crisis—most recently the depression of the 1930 's and World War II. In
the main, the market economy dictates the allocation of resources in the
private sector. Those allocated through the national government are done
so on a remarkably fragmented, and what appears to be an irrational
political basis.
Democracy has been defined by Straus Hupe as:
a method for sharing power on the basis of legal equality
and for holding the rulers accountable by constant and
certain other kinds of periodic scrutiny. This definition
leaves out much of what is claimed by various schools
of thought as being the complete or more desirable
features of democracy. It describes, however, the
characteristics which have distinguished all working
democracies from other types of government in history.
(65:38)
This working definition portrays democracy as a methodology. It is
concerned with means and not ends. As such it is entirely devoid of end
values such as market economies, states' rights, competition and free
enterprise.
The process of devising a system of government for the United States
that incorporated this methodology, and also protected existing values
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in the year 1789 was not easy. The Jeffersonian concept of a loose
confederation of states had not functioned well in the preceeding thir-
teen years. The individual state governments had functioned well enough
but the central government under the Articles of Confederation had been
essentially impotent. It had no formal executive body and it lacked the
means to lay and collect taxes. More importantly, it could not control
either intranational or international commerce. Max Ferrand commented
that "The Americans were an agricultural and trading people. Interference
with the arteries of commerce was cutting off the very life-blood of the
nation, and something had to be done." (26:7)
One of the more influential architects of the constitution was James
Madison. He was instrumental in forming a set of influential guidelines
known as the Randolf Resolutions. Farrand suggests that the more correct
title for these resolutions is the Virginia Plan (Farrand : 68) . Montesquieu
writings were taken as gospel, not only by Madison, but by many other
members of the Constitutional Convention as well. He had stated an
absolute requirement for the separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers. The Virginia Plan provided for these three separate
branches of government. It also provided for a bicameral legislature.
Professor Robert A. Dahl, in his book titled A Preface to Democratic
Theory
,
describes the "Madisonian" theory of democracy as an effort to
bring off a compromise between the power of majorities and the power of
minorities." (17:4) In his opinion, Madison was concerned not only
with establishing a government which would prevent the majority from
tyrannizing over the minorities, but also in preventing the minorities
from tyrannizing over the majority.
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Madison, in the Federalist, No. 47, defined tyranny as "the
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the
same hands, whether one, few, or many. . ." (22:313) Although this
definition may be considered arbitrary and argumentative, it serves to
give insight into his thought processes.
Federalist No. 48 showed clearly Madison feared the proposed
legislative branch would become dominant. "It is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." (22:323)
Federalist No. 67-77 were probably written by Alexander Hamilton,
and indicated that the executive branch was not distrusted as was the
legislative. It was considered at that time as the strong point for the
minority of wealth, status, and power. (18:9)
It can be seen that the framers of the Constitution were convinced
that the only way power could be controlled in a democratic national
government, and existing values protected, was to erect a power structure
that would place various interests in opposition. Not only were there
three branches of government to check and balance each other, but the
branch considered to be the most powerful, and hence dangerous, was
divided into two counterbalancing power centers— the House and the Senate.
Professor Dahl, a political scientist, collaborated with Professor
Charles Lindbloom, an economist, in writing a book titled Politics ,
Economics, and Welfare . (19) In this work they address themselves to
the process of political/economic decision-making within the United
States' form of democracy.
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Hierarchy, in a strict sense, exists when leaders exercise unilateral
control over non-leaders. The explicit form of this which is identified
with the United States government is bureaucracy. A hierarchical
bureaucracy is not in itself democratic. The governments of Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union are cases in point. However, in modified form it
has become indispensable to the United States system of government.
Polyarchy is a process wherein nonleaders control leaders and vice
versa. It, in itself would qualify as a democratic process. If polyarchy
and hierarchical bureaucracy exist simultaneously, the polyarchy serves
to dilute and democratize the bureaucracy. Dahl and Lindbloom expound at
length on the prerequisites necessary for polyarchy to emerge and exist.
They conclude that polyarchy does serve as the basis for democratic
government in the United States today.
The third method, bargaining, concerns a process wherein leaders
(i.e. decision-makers) control each other. In recent years Lindbloom has
expanded this thesis into what amounts to a convincing model of present
day governmental decision-making. It should be noted that leaders
bargain from positions of strength and the more powerful a leader is,
relative to the leader or leaders with whom he bargains, the more favor-
able bargain he can demand. It can be seen that a substantial polyarchy




Polyarchy requires a considerable degree of social pluralism— that
is, a diversity of social organizations with a large measure of autonomy
with respect to one another. (19:302) Social pluralism is considered
to exist in a society to the extent that there exist a number of differ-
ent organizations through which control is exerted and these organizations
are not subject to control by a unified body of leaders.
Social pluralism depends on the existence of many social organizations
which have organizational loyalties and organizational leaders. These
provide the basis for focusing the divided power of individuals into
cohesive and effective functional units. The existence of many such
organizations facilitates competition among groups and maximizes the
probability that an individual can find an organization which represents
values close to his own. This process also facilitates the discovery and
rise of political leaders whose chief attribute is negotiating or
bargaining settlements among conflicting social organizations.
The larger the number of social organizations, the greater the
probability that a person will be a member of more than one organization.
The ambiguities created by individuals simultaneously sharing the goals
of many groups are much in evidence. The farmer who demands higher price
supports through the Farm Bureau Federation and yet is a member of a
local "taxpayers association" demanding lower federal taxes is not uncommon,
The Senator who decries the war in Vietnam out of "loyalty to his consti-
tuents," and then berates the Defense Departments for inefficiency in
prosecuting that war is another case of countering loyalties. The college
professor who helps stage a "sit-in" in a nearby community on behalf of
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"improving equality among all citizens" and then avails himself of rest-
rooms on the campus which are segregated on the basis of "Faculty and
Staff only" does not see a conflict in his actions.
As well as providing the means for individuals to associate with
organizations which embody their ideals, social pluralism provides multiple
channels for two way communications. It increases the probability that
individuals will have access to information, however accurate it may be,
that did not come to them via governmentally controlled channels. By the
same token, it insures upward communication through channels that are
relatively free of inputs from governmental officials.
In all of these ways social pluralism serves as a complex distri-
bution of control and power. It does not remove the need for a bureau-
cracy but it provides the basis for polyarchy and its moderating effects
on the governmental bureaucracy. Individual citizens in the various
organizations are controlled by their leaders and in turn control their
leaders. These leaders control other leaders and in turn are controlled
by them. Thus a whole society of reciprocal relationships reaching from
individual citizens to the highest levels of government exists. However,
as Dahl and Lindbloom point out, a national political alliance based on
this concept is ". . .a vast and slightly shakey enterprise, not a mono-
lith but a pile of billiard balls held together with a poor grade of
paste." (19:306)
In spite of the frailty of this power structure, the authors go on
to say. . . "Social pluralism is so great in the United States that,
combined with the constitutional structure, the extent of bargaining
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among diverse social groups in making government policy is a dominant
feature of our political system." (19:307)
If the polyarchial bureaucracy is in fact a representative model of
the Federal Government, and if social pluralism is the basis of its
power, and bargaining among its primary means of control, then the
anomalies cited concerning conflicting defense procurement policies are
easily explained. The relationship between the Defense Department, the
Congress, and the Defense Industry, while complex, becomes more rational.
The executive branch is a collection of sometimes mutually supporting
as well as sometimes competing agencies. The Congress with its various
caucuses, committees, regional factions, and political party groupings
presents an equally fluid and complex structure. It is not surprising
that a great assortment of both interbranch and intrabranch alliances of
varying duration arise. For example, the Department of Defense and the
House Armed Services Committee often find themselves aligned against the
Bureau of the Budget and the House Appropriations Committee.
Senators and Representatives as well as their various groupings in
the Congress are responsible to many different interest groups, as are
the public servants and agencies of the Executive Branch. It is not in-
consistant from a Congressman's viewpoint, as a Congressional Committee
member, to badger the Defense Department for greater efficiency in its
operations and then to protest vehemently as an individual politician
when the increased efficiency takes the form of closing an obsolescent
military base in his district. Nor is it unusual for a public adminis-
trator or agency to resort to friends in the Congress to protect a mutual
interest, even against attack from the President.
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One of the most noted cases wherein an agency of the Executive
Branch and Congress joined forces to thwart the will of the President
and the Head of an Executive Department is reported by Harold Stein's
book, Public Administration and Policy Development . (64) In the Kings
River Project case, the Corps of Engineers defied the President, the
Secretary of War, the National Resources Planning Board, and the Bureau
of the Budget in a battle over whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(United States Engineering Department) or the Bureau of Reclamation was
to construct a particular dam. Not only did the agency and its Congres-
sional allies prevail over the wishes of both Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman, but the agency's head, Major General Thomas M. Robins, actually
"took to the stump" in California in the process of developing political
support for his agency's position.
In another notorious case where the Executive Branch was powerless
to enforce its wishes, and a conflict of interests in the Congress is
clearly seen, the Senate and the House collaborated to decimate the Grazing
Bureau of the Interior Department. Each body acted as it did for entirely
different reasons. Senator Pat McCarren of Nevada, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, wanted to restrict the Grazing
Bureau's activities because he considered it was dealing too harshly and
arbitrarily with the western stockman—particularly his constituents.
The House Committee wanted to punish the Grazing Bureau for not protecting
the values of the eastern conservationists by vigorous enforcement of the
grazing rules and laws on the western ranges. The Grazing Bureau was
doomed regardless which course it pursued. Aggressive action at either
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extreme would spell serious difficulties at the hands of the Committee
which favored the other extreme. A middle of the road strategy alienated
both committees and they reacted with a committee's most powerful weapon
—
a severely restricted authorization for funds. The Executive Branch was
unable to intervene. (28)
The centralization of authority and power in the Defense Department
as cited in Chapter Two served to reduce the bargaining that had formerly
taken place between the individual military services and Congress.
However, the Secretary of Defense on occasion still finds himself confron-
ted with strong alliances of Congressional Committees and military services
in respect to particular issues. The House Armed Services Committee and
the Air Force have combined to oppose the Secretary on the discontinuation
of the manned bomber program. The Navy has two very influential and
vociferous champions for its program to procure surface ships powered by
nuclear energy in the form of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the
House Armed Services Committee. In recent years funds have been author-
ized and appropriated for nuclear powered vessels that the Secretary of
Defense neither requested nor desired.
Bargaining among the military services has probably increased as the
Secretary's program for greater coordination and mutual support between
the services has taken effect. In response to a personal letter to
former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, Concerning his
position on the subject of whether the Navy should have nuclear power
for one of its new aircraft carriers, he responded:
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To clarify my position on the carrier during
fiscal year 1963, I was not in favor of adding to the
Navy carrier task force, and I am still not in favor
of it. However, once the decision was made to purchase
another carrier, then I was in favor of nuclear power.
(41)
Having lost in the first bargaining situation of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff vote on whether to include the carrier in the 1963 budget, he
later sided with the Navy in their attempt to have the carrier changed
to nuclear power. It is not surprising that the Navy, in turn, gave him
support on some Air Force programs about which it would normally be
expected to be less than enthusiastic. It can be seen that an iron clad
monolithic hierarchical bureaucracy does not exist in the Department of
Defense either. Polyarchy and bargaining are very much in evidence not
only at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level but at every echelon.
Thus one discerns that policy formation at the national level is the
result of many factors. Conflicting policies within the framework of the
Federal Government are the result of a variety of pluralistic forces.
Not only are they to be expected, but in a sense they are the very essence
of the United States democracy.
This proposition is contrary to the thesis advanced by C. Wright
Mills and cited in Chapter One. In The Power Elite he devotes an entire
chapter to the subject of the Theory of Balance. (49) His conclusion
concerning the effects of pluralism are the exact opposite of the case
presented in this research. He considers that pluralism, rather than
serving the democratic process, really represents a manifestation of the
"divide and rule" philosophy. The splintering of power into many small
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and relatively weak organizations provides a suitable environment wherein
the power elite can effectuate its will in an unpublicized and inconspicuous
manner
.
In a paragraph which essentially summarizes that chapter he states:
But the society in which we now live consists of
an economy in which the small entrepreneurs have been
replaced in key areas by a handful of centralized
corporations, of a polity in which the division of
authority has become inbalanced in such a way that the
executive branch is supreme, the legislative relegated
to the middle levels of power and the judiciary with
due time-lag, to the drift of policy which it did not
initiate; and finally, the new society is clearly a
political economy in which political and economic
affairs are intricately and deeply joined together.
(49:260)
There is little question that most, if not all of this is true.
But he does not state how it could be otherwise. The well-being of the
United States rests on its economic power. The tremendous productivity
efficiency of the large corporations contributes greatly to this economic
power. Modern technology has created both the products and the means of
production that makes the Untied States the most affluent nation the
world has known. Large corporations are in many instances the most
economically efficient means of converting national resources into con-
sumer products.
Technological change has occured much more rapidly than sociological
change. Industrial organization has assimilated change much more quickly
than governmental organization. It is this very fact that tends to make
private defense industry better suited to weapon system production than
a governmental industry. The solution would seem to be to speed up the
modernization of sociological organization rather than condemn out of
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hand the technologically oriented organizations.
This is not to say that concentration of industry and biggness in
business does not harbor danger for the American democracy. It does.
But this danger long has been recognized. The passage of Anti-Trust Laws
and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission were explicit recog-
nitions of this danger. The Congress has also enacted Renegotiation
Laws which limit the profits that may be realized on defense contracts.
And, as has been pointed out, the counterbalance of small business is not
without its protectors and promoters in the Federal Government.
Given that the Defense Department procurement policies do shape the
structure of the Defense Industry, it must be appreciated that these poli-
cies in turn are shaped by pressures from Congress, the remainder of the
Executive Branch, the Judicial Branch, and other less well institution-
alized and somewhat transitory power foci of this pluralistic society.
At the present time the combined exogenous forces including those which
militate against concentration in any industry, those which would limit
defense industry in particular, and those which favor greater small
business participation in all government procurement have at least bal-
anced the forces within and without the Defense Department that tend
toward concentrating the Defense Industry. If the indications developed
in this study are correct, large firms will receive a proportionally
lesser portion of defense procurement in the immediate future.
This probably will incur an economic cost in the form of less
efficiency in the cumulative effort of the defense contractors and
greater administrative costs within the Defense Department. Yet, it is
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for the most part not an inadvertant inefficiency, but rather the cost
of protecting values other than that of absolute efficiency in the
allocation of national resources. This is the consequence of doing






In the twenty-one years since the ending of World War II the earth
has been an armed camp. The Communist prognostication that the United
States would suffer a cataclysmic depression after the war, and that it
would be forced to turn to communism has not materialized. The United
States GNP has more than tripled instead.
The many forecasts in the western world that the Soviet Union's
post-World War II empire would be rent assunder by the people revolting
against the totalitarian Communist governments has not come to pass
either. Although there have been revolts of varying intensity in the
satellite countries of Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, Communism is
still firmly entrenched. The Soviet Union and its Communist satellites
have made rapid technological and economic progress. Problems in agri-
culture have not been solved, but the industrialization of Russia and
advances in education, the sciences, and general technology have been
impressive indeed.
As the Soviet Union's economy has become more affluent and the
fallacies of classical communist ideology as a plan of economic action
have become more apparent, there has been less concern with adhering to
the details of classical communism. Many capitalistic devices such as
partial incorporation of a price system as a means of allocating resources,
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and the use of incentives at both the labor and management level have
been adopted. Even free enterprise has gained a new lease on life in
the Soviet Union in the form of some farmers being allowed to raise and
market poultry and produce raised on privately controlled garden plots.
Street vendors have appeared again in the resort areas.
All of this indicates that perhaps the Soviet Union's revolution
has matured to the point that international competition between totali-
tarian Communism and democratic Capitalism could begin to focus primarily
on economic and other peaceful political means. A gradual disarmament
plan would become a real possibility in such an environment.
However, the revolution in Communist China is much less mature.
China's problems in industrializing her primitive economy and feeding her
hungry masses are not unlike those of the Soviet Union's in the pre-World
War II and early post-war period. There is a practical necessity to keep
the revolutionary zeal at a fever pitch. Responsibility for the depriva-
tions that must be endured in this phase of industrial growth must be
shifted, if possible, to parties outside China. There is a strong desire
for a buffer zone of continguous land area under Asian communist or neu-
tralist control to insulate the heartland of China from an unfriendly
world. This has been accomplished in North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongo-
lia, Tibet and parts of Laos. However, this perimeter is not yet com-
plete.
The willingness of Communist China to devote a substantial portion
of her industrial capability toward developing nuclear weapons, and
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armaments in general, at the expense of improving her industrial base is
indicative of the priority associated with military strength. If the
same general pattern of growth and expansion of the Soviet Union is fol-
lowed in China, then it must be expected that China will not hesitate to
use her military force to complete a buffer zone of puppet governments
around China, and possibly to acquire the resources considered essential
to further rapid industrialization.
Three countries serve to constrain the expansion of China to fulfill
this role. The order of threat from the Chinese standpoint would pro-
bably be the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. While India
would not loom as an immediate aggressive threat, she shares with Com-
munist China many of the problems of industrialization and food. Com-
petition between these countries in the land areas between them and the
East Indies appears inevitable. But for the present, the two countries
which have the military power to constrain China's natural impulses to-
ward expansion are the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the present environment of international relations the presence
of an aggressive and revolutionarily zealous Communist China will cer-
tainly deter the Soviet Union and the United States from an extensive
bilateral disarmament program. If this is an accurate assessment and
both the United States and the Soviet Union continue their present roles
in world affairs, both will have to continue to allocate a substantial
part of their national resources to military purposes.
The relentless march of technology will present ever more sophisti-
cated "total war" systems, with ever increasing costs. The revulsion on
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the part of the Soviet Union and the United States toward jeopardizing
their total economies militate against the use of these "ultimate sys-
tems. However both countries will be trapped into defending against
the opponent's offensive systems while devising offensive systems of
her own which will obsolete the opponent's defenses.
Under the circumstances small conventional weapon wars of a brush-
fire nature appear more probable. This will require the continuation of
tactical air power, mechanized mobility on the land and the sea, and in
the air, and personnel intensive military territory-controlling organi-
zations.
The cost of defense will increase gradually and past trends indicate
that the defense budget of the United States will account for between
eight and ten percent of the expanding GNP. Some thirty billion dollars
a year will be allocated for procurement of goods and services in support
of the defense effort. Thus, the Defense Industry appears to be assured
of a continued existence in the foreseeable future.
The Department of Defense does not appear destined to undertake a
greater direct role in the weapon system procurement cycle. There will
be a continuing need for more and better qualified people in the Defense
Department to perform the required in house management functions includ-
ing the oversight of the Defense Industry.
The forces which opt for greater efficiency in the procurement of
large systems will not lessen. The Charles Plan or similar approaches
which place greater responsibilities and incentives for efficiency on
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the private systems managers will dictate less direct control by the
Defense Department over the system manager's subcontracting programs.
This may result in sufficient political pressure to cause a less compre-
hensive approach to system procurement.
Most of the other management techniques which have come into being
under the McNamara regime will continue in some form. Those that tend
to limit Congressional influence in defense procurement may be revised.
However these changes will not be large in scope.
The greatest tribute that has been paid Secretary McNamara and his
efforts are found in a letter of transmittal dated May 25, 1966, from
Senator Paul Douglas, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Procure-
ment and Regulation, to Congressman Wright Patman, Chairman of the
Joint Economic Committee:
I also point out that for nearly two decades con-
gressional committees, individual members, study groups,
the two Hoover Commissions, and many others have advo-
cated that the Secretary of Defense take strong action
to bring about efficient management in the sprawling de-
fense complex, particularly in the common supply and ser-
vice areas, secure more competitive bidding as intended
by law, utilize more fully the billions of dollars worth
of deteriorating inventories and release unneeded real
properties valued at billions of dollars thus building
rather than eroding the tax base.
On December 30, i960, I wrote to Secretary-Desig-
nate McNamara urging that a number of actions be taken
along these lines. He has gone to work with courage,
unparalleled ability and tenacity, and has made tremen-
dous progress in improving both the organization and
management of the Defense Establishment. In so doing,
cost reductions of several billions of dollars annually
have been achieved by adopting, among others, many of
the suggestions of this subcommittee. In the process
of determined action, toes have been trod upon, oxen
gored, and hostility encountered which is envitable.
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Errors may have been committed and certainly much
remains to be done in carving more fat and waste as this
report reveals but I urge everyone to view our suggestions
and recommendations against the background of the scope
of the job and the unprecedented accomplishments. We
must not undermine either the greatly improved structure
or its chief architect nor on the other hand relax our
efforts toward further progress. (69)
This, from one of the best qualified critics in the Congress is
heady praise indeed. It also indicates the quality and intensity of
Congressional support for greater efficiency in defense procurement and
management
.
It must be appreciated that Mr. Mills 1 remark cited in the previous
chapter concerning the decline in power of the Congress relative to the
Executive Branch is well founded. Part of this is due to the increase
in size of the Executive Branch as compared to the Congress. Another
factor is that the Congressional Committees have been slow in providing
themselves their own expertise in the modern managerial techniques which
are being used more and more in the Executive Branch. These problems
have been explored in depth by several studies in recent years. The
most useful of these is deemed by this writer to be the Arthur D. Little
study released in the fall of 1965. (^2) Congress' inability to com-
prehend some of the more complex problem solutions submitted by agencies
of the Executive Branch may account for the extensive attention given to
small items during authorization and appropriation hearings while other
items and programs of many times the dollar value receive only perfunctory
treatment.
However, it is apparent that Congress has not been overwhelmed by
either the increase of size or changes in management techniques in the
152

Executive Branch. There is much evidence that the Congressional Com-
mittees feel their thoughts on matters such as the need for nuclear-
powered surface ships, the continuation of a manned-bomber program, and
the selection of the system manager for the TFX aircraft are at least
equal to that of the Defense Department. The small business programs
are but one concrete manifestation of the countervailing power which




The circumstances surrounding the emergence of the United States'
policy of maintaining large and very expensive armed forces on a con-
tinuing basis have been examined. It was demonstrated that since the
end of the Korean War, defense expenditures have averaged over $^5
billion annually. Procurement of goods and services accounted for
approximately one-half of each year's expenditures. These expenditures
of over twenty billion dollars a year have fostered the growth of a
full-fledged Defense Industry in the United States.
Experience gained in World War II emphasized the inadequacy of the
command structure of the armed services and the civilian components of
the military agencies of the defense establishment. The policy of main-
taining a large defense establishment in conjunction with technological
advances dictated a complete and drastic revision of this structure.
This resulted in a series of legislative actions which centralized in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the power and authority required
to integrate the efforts of all the armed services.
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The implementation of this legislative authority was not possible
without improved management techniques. The impact of a burgeoning
technology also created a need for new management concepts. The requi-
site management concepts and techniques evolved rather slowly and on a
fragmented basis until Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, took office
in I96I. He surrounded himself with a regimen of quantitatively oriented
and analytically inclined top level civilian managers who synthesized the
individual management techniques into a workable and centrally directed
management structure.
The interface between the Defense Department and the Defense In-
dustry has been altered over the years as the new management methods
have matured. The most noticeable impact has been in the area of con-
tracting policies. Much attention has been given to improving the ef-
ficiency of defense contracting. Increased competition and fixed-price
contracts have been the keynotes of this effort.
The culmination of efforts to increase efficiency in all aspects of
the procurement of large weapon systems is the Charles Plan. It takes
into account the cost of the weapon system over its entire life— from
production through its entire operational service period. It injects
competition at a level and on a scale never before attempted. The re-
sulting fixed-price incentive contracts for large weapon systems such
as the C5 transport aircraft exceed one billion dollars. The cost of
bid proposals runs into the millions of dollars and severely limits the
number of firms which can bid on such procurements. Hence, bidding
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participation is confined to a small number of gigantic, defense oriented
business firms.
The centralizing of power in the Defense Department and the accom-
panying schemes for promoting efficiency in defense procurement have had
pronounced effects on the structure of the Defense Industry. This
structure has tended toward greater concentration in the twenty years
since World War II. In 19^5 the ten largest defense firms accounted
for 30$ of the prime contracts and in I96I this had increased to 39$.
The 50 largest defense firms accounted for 58$ of the prime contracts
in 19^5 and 68$ in I96I. The 100 largest firms captured 67$ of the
prime contracts in 19^-5 and 76$ in I96I.
The Charles Plan, and other procedures preceding it, which resulted
in the procurement of entire large weapon systems through a single firm,
have fostered this concentration within the Defense Industry. Since I963
the two largest firms together have accounted for over 11$ of all prime
contracts of over $10,000 value. However, the share of the 50 largest
firms decreased from 51-9$ to 48.2$ and the 100 largest firms from 73-9$
to 68.9$.
While some defense procurement policies have promoted increased
concentration of defense contracting at one extreme, there is at the
same time a countervailing force that serves to diffuse defense procure-
ment to firms other than the 100 largest defense firms. The main factor
which contributes to this anomaly was isolated and examined. It is the
Defense Department's aggressive program to insure that small businesses
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get a substantial share of defense contracts. This program is the result
of national policy which requires the protection and promotion of small
businesses. Although this program does not appear to be economically
efficient because of the administrative and other costs incurred in its
prosecution, it is vigorously pursued because of its contribution to
other values. Both Presidential and Secretary of Defense attention has
been given to this program during the McNamara regime.
In addition, there are programs such as "Buy American, " "aid to
labor-distressed area, " and the "maintainance of an industrial mobiliza-
tion base," and others, which are not in themselves economically efficient
However, these programs protect values other than short term economic
efficiency and represent the will of Congress. To a lesser degree these
programs also work against concentration in the defense industry.
The phenomenon of the Defense Department executing programs simul-
taneously which appear to be in opposition is a result of the United
States' system of democracy. Many conflicting values are promoted and
protected at the same time. While at first blush this appears irrational,
when it is considered in view of the way in which political and economic
power is diffused throughout the national government and society in
general, it can be seen as the hallmark of a polyarchial democracy.
The first of three specific hypotheses set forth in Chapter One
stated that "there is a discernible trend toward concentration in the
Defense Industry." This has been affirmed in respect to the long period
from World War II through 1965 . The shorter period of the McNamara regime
shows some indication of a reversal of this trend.
156

The second hypothesis was that "decision-making and other management
techniques presently used in the Department of Defense are contributing
to and accelerating this trend toward concentration." While the annual
number of very large procurements has been substantial since the mid-1950s,
the share of contracts awarded to the five largest defense firms in terms
of percentage of the value prime contracts of over $10,000, has gradually
decreased from 25% in 1959 to 22/o in I965 . The 100 largest firms' share
decreased from 73-8% to 68.9% in that period. However, the two largest
firms accounted for 12.4% of such contracts in 1959 and 12% in 1965-
This figure reached a low point of 10.3% in 1962 and has gradually in-
creased since that year. This remarkably high percentage, plus the slight
upward trend for the past three years, for the two largest firms is con-
sidered to be the result of Defense Department policies in respect to
the procurement of large weapon systems. However, the decreased per-
centage of all other groupings of the 100 largest firms indicate a less-
ening of overall concentration.
The third hypothesis that there are countervailing forces in the
Congress and the Executive Branch which serve to deter this trend
toward concentration has been affirmed. The effort to diffuse defense
procurement has been effective and the small business share of the value
of all prime contracts with business firms in the United States has
increased from 15-9% in I96I to 19.6% in 1965 . Thus, if these trends
continue, both the very large and the small firms' share of the defense
market will increase. There will be a commensurate decrease in the
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percentage of the defense market going to the large defense firms other
than the few very largest ones. Due to the idiosyncrasies of the United
States' form of democracy, concentration and diffusion of the Defense
Industry is occurring simultaneously.
The threat of the Defense Industry becoming influential enough in
the Councils of Government to influence national policy is real. However
there appears to be a growing awareness of this hazard. Increased Con-
gressional and public attention to the problems of determining national
goals, and in particular of determining the role of national defense
machinery in pursuit of these goals, should provide the necessary sur-
veillance. It is essential that the Defense Industry be kept in the
role of servant to the national government and as a necessary but tem-
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